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Assessment of the Impact of EU
Enlargement and Implementation
of the Schengen Treaty in CEE
countries on Ukraine
Enlargement of the EU, which is to take place 
in 2004, will draw a new line of division 
on the continent)between the united Europe 
and the states that remain outside of it. 
EU accession of CEE countries will result 
in the disappearance of an area of free flow 
of persons, goods, and services; what could have
been considered an achievement in the region –
freedom of movement of people – may become 
a thing of the past. 
This issue focuses on policy in order to systematise
the extant knowledge about the impact 
of the Schengen Treaty on EU candidate countries
and their neighbours from the economic, social, 
and legal perspectives, in order to identify 
the likely consequences and recommend solutions
regarding the future EU borders. 
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On  June  Belgium, Germany, France,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the
Schengen Agreement, which stipulated the grad%
ual elimination of border and customs controls on
the borders of these territories. This was to be an
intergovernmental agreement for all European
Union countries, under the slogan “Europe with%
out borders”. There were no details included in the
treaty; the details were provided in the Convention
Implementing the Schengen Agreement, which
came into force on  June  and was to be rat%
ified by the parliaments of member states. The
Convention was signed as an international public
rights agreement, which specified the participating
countries’ obligations but did not determine any
rights or duties for citizens and organisations.
Domestic laws could stipulate some exceptions, as
specified in national constitutions or internation%
al law. The Convention is open to being joined by
any EU country. 
EU legislation is characterised by the so%called
basic freedoms, which include free movement of
goods, services, and capital, and movement of per%
sons. It means that every EU citizen has the right
to move freely within the EU; this applies to both
the free migration of workers and the establishment
of business enterprises. According to the definition
of this freedom, all citizens of EU member states are
free to choose to reside in another EU state. After
the Agreement on the European Economic Area
(EEA) was promulgated, it was possible for EU
states to embrace most of the European Free Trade
Area (EFTA) countries, which also enjoy that
kind of freedom.
After the Schengen Agreement comes into effect,
borders between the states which are members of the
agreement can be crossed by citizens of these states
(and other citizens legally staying on their territo%
ry) without passport control. These privileges do
not apply to the citizens of third countries.
Simplification of border controls inside the
Schengen area demands strict external border con%
trol. Effective  May , the Schengen Protocol
to the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated Schengen
cooperation into the framework of the EU.
Consequently, Ukrainian governmental institu%
tions have recognised the priority of approximat%
ing national law to the corresponding European
law insofar as simplification of border formalities.
The Schengen treaty:
Consequences for national
migration policy in Ukraine
Viktor CHUMAK
In any country, migration management
involves two specific spheres—regulating
legal migration and counteracting illegal
migration.
In Ukraine, legal aspects of migration man1
agement lie within the competence of the
State Department for Nationalities and
Migration, which functions within the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine. The depart1
ment performs the following migration
management tasks:
• shaping immigration and refugee poli1
cy;
• consideration of refugee and asylum
seekers’ cases, and those of illegal
migrants for whom it is impossible to
return to their countries of residence
due to political or other reasons;
• provision of temporary accommodation
for refugees during the time of investi1
gation;
• assistance in the voluntary return of
refugees and the development of pro1
grams for their integration or reintegra1
tion into Ukrainian society.
In addition, cooperation with the Ministry
of Labour and Social Policy, Ministry of the
Interior, Ministry of Healthcare, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and the State Border Guard
Committee of Ukraine enables refugees’ and
legal immigrants’ problems to be resolved.
Presently, Ukraine possesses a well1developed
system of legislation on migration manage1
ment. In the last few years, the legislative basis
for migration issues has been established in
full compliance with EU standards. Below is a
list of positive changes in this field:
• adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On
immigration” effective  June ;
• adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On
refugees” effective  June ;
• ratification by a Law of Ukraine of the
International Convention on Refugee
Status dated  June  and the
Protocol of , effective  January
;
• adoption of a new Law of Ukraine “On
Ukrainian citizenship” effective  Janu1
ary ;
• amendment of the Law of Ukraine “On
the legal status of foreigners”.
In addition to these results, the following
regulations address migration management
issues: “On the state border of Ukraine” and
“On the border guard forces of Ukraine”, as
well as the Administrative Code, decrees of
the President of Ukraine, and resolutions
and directives of the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine.
The Law of Ukraine 
“On immigration” 
Adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On immi1
gration” on  June  was undoubtedly
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Ukrainian regulations 
on migration and asylum, 
and their conformity to EU law
Legal migration
positive in this context. This act specified the
conditions and processes for the immigration
of foreigners and persons without citizenship.
The act defined the concepts of “immigra1
tion” and “immigrants”, as well as immigrant
quotas and immigration control agencies in
Ukraine.
Immigration is defined as the possibility for
foreigners and persons without citizenship to
enter or stay for permanent residence in
Ukraine according to current legislation. An
“immigrant” is defined as a foreigner or a per1
son without citizenship who received permis1
sion for immigration and entered Ukraine for
permanent residence or, being in Ukraine
legally, received permission for immigration
and stayed for permanent residence.
Said permission is granted within a fixed
immigration quota, representing the maxi1
mum number of foreigners and persons with1
out citizenship who are to be granted permis1
sion for immigration during a given calendar
year.
The Ukrainian immigration quota is set for
particular categories of immigrants by the
Cabinet of Ministers:
• scientists and cultural workers, the immi1
gration of whom meets the interests of
Ukraine;
• highly qualified specialists and workers
who are needed by Ukraine;
• foreigners who have invested in Ukraine’s
economy a sum of money in hard curren1
cy valued at not less than , USD,
registered according to procedures
defined by the Cabinet of Ministers;
• persons who are of blood relation, such as
brother and sister, grandfather and grand1
mother, grandson and granddaughter of
Ukrainian citizens;
• persons who formerly possessed Ukrainian
citizenship;
• parents, husband (wife) of the immigrant
and their minor children;
• persons who have lived permanently in
Ukraine for three years since the date they
received refugee status or asylum while in
Ukraine, as well as their parents, spouse,
and minor children who live with them.
In certain cases, status can be granted beyond
the immigration quota to the following cate1
gories of migrants:
• persons who have been married for more
than two years and their spouse is a citizen
of Ukraine, or a child or parent of a
Ukrainian citizen; 
• persons who are guardians of Ukrainian
citizens or are in custody of Ukrainian cit1
izens;
• persons who have a proven right to
Ukrainian citizenship;
• persons whose immigration can be of
interest to Ukraine. 
Permission for immigration 
is not granted to:
• persons sentenced to terms of more than 
 year of imprisonment for actions which
are defined as offences by Ukrainian law, if
said sentence is not repealed by law;
• persons who have committed crimes
against peace, humanity, humanism, or
military crime as specified in international
law, or are wanted for actions defined as
felonies by Ukrainian law, or who are pros1
ecuted while the previous case is not closed;
• persons who are chronic alcoholics, drug
addicts, or infected with a dangerous dis1
ease;
• persons who deliberately provided false
information in their applications for
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permission to immigrate, or who present1
ed forged documents;
• persons who are not allowed to enter the
country under Ukrainian law;
• persons in other cases, as defined by laws
of Ukraine.
On  January , the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine ratified the Convention On Refugee
Status dated  July , as well as the
Protocol of .
The year  saw significant changes in the
migration legislation of Ukraine, when the
updated Law of Ukraine “On refugees” was
adopted ( June ). It complies with the
main international documents on human
rights and the Constitution of Ukraine, which
specify the granting of asylum to foreigners
and persons without citizenship. The articles
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
were taken into consideration, as well. 
The Law of Ukraine “On refugees” specifies
the legal status of refugees in Ukraine, the
procedure for granting, losing, and revoking
refugee status, and guarantees for the protec1
tion of refugees by the government. 
The updated Law of Ukraine “On refugees”
outlines the conditions for acquiring refugee
status in Ukraine, which may be granted for a
certain period, while there are fears that a per1
son can be prosecuted on the basis of race,
religious confession, citizenship, social
group, or political views; and when said per1
son is outside the country of their citizenship
and is not able to use the protection of this
country or not willing to use this protection
because of the reasons mentioned above (pre1
viously, in Ukraine refugee status was granted
only for three months).
The new law considerably expands the rights
of refugees, as well as of people who have
received refugee status in Ukraine. People
granted refugee status in Ukraine have equal
rights with foreigners or people without citi1
zenship that are legally staying in Ukraine.
Such people enjoy the same rights and free1
doms and have the same responsibilities as cit1
izens of Ukraine, with exceptions as specified
by the Constitution and acts of Ukraine, as
well as international agreements agreed to be
binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
(Ukrainian parliament).
Persons granted refugee status in Ukraine
have equal rights with Ukrainian citizens who
have marital and family rights. Persons grant1
ed refugee status in Ukraine have the right to
receive financial aid, pensions, accommoda1
tion, or other kinds of social care, according
to the procedure specified by the laws of
Ukraine. This list is not exclusive; other addi1
tional rights can be defined by the legislation
of Ukraine, but this list of rights is not subject
to abridgement.
The new Law “On refugees” includes provi1
sions stating that refugees cannot be extradit1
ed or forced to return to the country where
their life and freedom are endangered by per1
secution for their social status, race, confes1
sion, nationality, citizenship, or political views
(Article ); and refugees are not to be prose1
cuted for illegal crossing of the state border.
However, like any other country in the world,
Ukraine maintains a principle of not granting
refugee status to persons who endanger peace
and society, namely: 
• persons who have committed crimes
against peace, military crimes, or crimes
against humanity and humanism, as stated
in international law;
• persons who have committed grave
felonies outside of Ukraine before enter1
ing the country with the purpose of
obtaining refugee status, if such actions
are considered to be grave felonies by the
Criminal Code of Ukraine;
• persons who are guilty of actions which
run counter to the purpose and principles
of the United Nations;
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• persons for whom it has been determined
that the conditions specified by the sec1
ond paragraph of Article  of the law are
absent.
Also, status is not granted to persons who:
• before entering Ukraine were recognised
as refugees or received asylum in another
country;
• before entering Ukraine with the purpose
of receiving refugee status stayed in a safe
third country. This regulation does not
affect children separated from their fami1
lies, and those who were born or lived per1
manently in Ukraine, as well as their
descendants (children and grandchildren).
In Ukraine, refugee status was granted to
, people in , which was more than in
the neighbouring countries of Poland,
Belarus, and Lithuania put together. Thus, it is
natural that Ukraine faces a number of practi1
cal problems in providing them with accom1
modation and essentials, and also extraditing
those not eligible for refugee status.
In , refugees to Ukraine came from:
• Europe – , including:
Russia – 
Bosnia1Herzegovina – 
Yugoslavia – ;
• Asia – ,, including: 
Afghanistan – ,
Armenia – 
Azerbaijan – 
Iraq – 
Syria – ;
• Africa – , including:
Congo – 
Sudan – 
Angola – 
Ethiopia – .
The majority of people seeking refugee status
do so on the territory of Ukraine. They are cit1
izens of countries supplying illegal migrants
who, having filed applications and obtained
the status of refugee, attempt to cross the west1
ern Ukrainian border illegally, and lose their
status. In , more than  persons lost
their refugee status in Ukraine.
Another problem consists in the fact that
the majority of foreigners who apply for
refugee status in Ukraine lives, as a rule, in
other CIS countries; however, they did not
apply for such status there. Having arrived
in Ukraine, in general, they attempt in this
way to become legalised, with the purpose of
further penetrating to neighbouring EU
countries.
Ukraine consults with other states, with the
Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and
with other international organisations
towards the aim of eliminating refugee
problems, improving their well1being and
legal status, as well as returning refugees to
their countries of citizenship or of previous
permanent residence if the conditions
under which they acquired refugee status
cease to be valid.
In spite of the assistance of the UNHCR,
Ukraine faces the problem of supplying
refugees with accommodation and all neces1
sary items for living. Moreover, the deporta1
tion of those who cannot receive the status
of refugee in Ukraine is still unsettled.
The registration procedure for foreigners
who legally arrive in Ukraine is set forth in
Article  of the Law of Ukraine “On the legal
status of foreigners”. Decree No.  of the
President of Ukraine dated  July 
made possible the registration by the
Ukrainian border guard of certain foreign1
ers legally arriving in Ukraine only on the
basis of the presentation of their passport
documents at Ukrainian border check1
points from  June . This new rule fully
complies with the conditions of the
Schengen Agreement and aims at simplify1
ing border control procedures.
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The Ministry of the Interior coordinates ille1
gal migration control in Ukraine, in close
cooperation with the State Border Guard
Committee.
As has already been mentioned, in 
there were many successful amendments
made to the Ukrainian legislation on migra1
tion policy, as well as to the legislation deter1
mining responsibility for illegal migration
in Ukraine. 
Liberalisation of the updated Criminal
Code of Ukraine enabled to lessen the
responsibility of illegal migrants for illicit
border crossing; they are now considered to
be victims of organised crime, namely, traf1
ficking of third1country citizens to Western
Europe. This offence now implies both
administrative and criminal responsibility,
but not necessarily imprisonment. 
However, criminal responsibilities of per1
sons involved in organising or assisting ille1
gal crossing of the Ukrainian border include
the forfeiture of assets acquired in the
process of criminal activity (Article  of
the Criminal Code). 
Apart from these legislative acts, the
Ukrainian side has prepared amendments
to the current Ukrainian legislation on
administrative offences that are designed to
make more severe the responsibility for
assisting illegal migrants (i.e., accommoda1
tion, transport). Responsibility includes
having to pay fines in the amount of the
assessed assistance. This measure is antici1
pated to have a positive impact on prevent1
ing such offences. 
The Law of Ukraine “On responsibility for
the air transportation across the border of
Ukraine of passengers who have no proper
documents” was adopted on  January .
This act fully complies with the regulations set
forth in articles . and .. of
Amendment , “Simplification of Forma1
lities”, to the Convention On International
Civil Aviation, which specifies that airline
companies hold responsibility for improper
examination of foreign passenger docu1
ments. Responsibility of air transportation
companies for the abovementioned offence
is specified in the relevant legislation of
many countries, including member states of
the EU. Adopting this new legislation is pro1
visional only in the case of complete adop1
tion of the legal act to the EU. Ukrainian
visa policy is determined by the criteria
described below. 
Today, visa1free entry on all types of pass1
ports is provided for citizens of countries
which are adjacent with Ukraine, such as the
Russian Federation and the Republic of
Belarus. Visa1free mutual crossing of state
borders is provided for countries such as
Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Hungary. A
visa regime is provided by Slovakia for
“internal passports” [domestic identifica1
tion documents]. A visa regime for crossing
state borders is provided between Ukraine
and the Republic of Bulgaria; it is based on
an agreement between the governments of
the two states on mutual trips between
Ukrainian and Bulgarian citizens.
To ensure national security and regulate
migration processes for suppliers of illegal
migrants, Ukraine must monitor the actions
of the following countries, as they are well
known for being sources of illegal immi1
grants: Vietnam, Guinea, Iran, Croatia,
Chile, and Yugoslavia. 
It is in the national interests of Ukraine to
become a member state of the EU, and thus
to be able to exert some influence in the
European arena. As a result of the EU
expansion which is expected in the near
future—Poland and Hungary joining the
EU—Ukraine’s borders will adjoin those of
the EU, which in effect will create a new
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Counteracting illegal migration 
geopolitical situation. In this regard, inter1
national political strategy must be deter1
mined clearly as to the integration of
Ukraine into the European political, eco1
nomic, and legal area, and should take into
account different points of view.
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
Resolution No.  dated  September 
states “On persons not holding visas entering
Ukraine who are citizens of EU countries
with diplomatic passports” are of a one1sided
order provided from ... In accor1
dance with the above document, diplomatic
passport bearers have a right to visit Ukraine
for  days without a visa. It also stipulates
the creation of mutual visa1free regimes for
Ukrainian diplomatic and government pass1
port bearers entering EU countries. 
Ukraine is not a supplier of illegal migrants.
It has many times emphasised its European
choice through its policy. That is why it is
regarded that EU members and candidate
countries must gradually change their visa
policy towards Ukraine, thereby providing a
visa1free regime for diplomatic and govern1
ment passports bearers at first, and then for
foreign officers and members of their fami1
lies, etc.
The traditions and trends of European
migration policies are reflected in
Ukrainian legislation, mainly in the admin1
istration of migration management, which
enforces national migration control legisla1
tion. In Ukraine, migration management is
implemented only under Ukrainian laws.
The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers in its reg1
ulations stipulates cooperation with law
enforcement and other executive agencies. Its
mandate to enhance migration control effi1
ciency includes by enforcing programs that
define the procedures for setting immigra1
tion quotas every year, adopting programs for
the prevention of trafficking in women and
children, etc. The Ministry of the Interior of
Ukraine is responsible for coordinating activ1
ities to preventing illicit migration.
At present, the creation of a unified organi1
sation in charge of migration in Ukraine is
being considered. Perhaps a central author1
ity of the executive government should be
specially created, based on one of the exist1
ing central executive bodies (Ministry of the
Interior, State Border Guard Committee, or
State Migration Committee).
Statistics concerning the number of people
crossing the national border or illegal
migrants are collected by the Border Forces
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs; all data
are passed to the State Statistics Committee
(Derzhkomstat).
During , the Border Forces of Ukraine
discovered , illegal migrants, coming
from countries within Southeast Asia, the
Middle East, and Africa (the list of countries
is published by the MFA). The following is a
breakdown of how these migrants were
detained:
• , people during illegal crossing of
the state border;
•  people on Ukrainian territory dur1
ing transit;
• , people were not allowed to enter
Ukraine.
Taking into consideration European
approaches to the statistics on CIS citizens
when they are considered to be illegal
migrants and violate visitation rights, the
number of illegal migrants revealed by the
Border Forces was , in . During
attempts to illegally cross the Ukrainian bor1
ders with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and
Romania,  persons who were citizens of
Moldova as well as Central Asian and
Caucasian regions of the CIS (Tajikistan,
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Management of migration processes
Table . Information on the entry/departure of foreigners 
(–)
Entry/departure Years Total/Ave.
  
Entered Ukraine ,, ,, ,, ,,
Left Ukraine ,, ,, ,, ,,
Didn’t leave ,, ,, , ,,
Didn’t leave (%) % % % %
Source: State Committee on Frontier Security of Ukraine  
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia,
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Armenia) were detained. 
Agents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
of Ukraine (MIA) discovered , persons
in  who violated their visitation rights in
Ukraine. They exceeded noticeably their
allowed terms of stay, had no personal papers,
and/or intended to illegally cross the state
border. 
In , the Border Forces and MIA agen1
cies of Ukraine discovered and charged
, illegal migrants.
According to migration experts, and taking
into consideration the inactivity of the inter1
national groups of peoples being smuggled,
the real number of illegal migrants must be
much greater. Additionally, the level of inac1
tivity is not officially defined. According to
specialists, it could be from % to % of
minor violations in the are of drugs and
weapons smuggling at the border. 
Analysis of the temporary arrival of foreign1
ers to Ukraine for studies, tourism, and per1
sonal affairs indicates that a certain number
of foreigners do not leave Ukraine within the
appointed term. As a result, they become
illegal migrants who try to illegally cross the
border in Western Ukraine with the aim of
illegal migration to Western Europe. In
January , , foreigners who arrived
in Ukraine to study committed such viola1
tions, and in January  , foreigners
who arrived ostensibly for tourism were
found to have stayed in Ukraine illegally.
According to analysts, about , for1
eigners annually use legal arrival into
Ukraine for studying, tourism, or personal
purposes actually plan for further illegal
migration. 
According to official statistics, in  %
of foreigners who had arrived in Ukraine
for temporary visits did not leave the coun1
try. More specifically, , were citizens
of countries which are known to be the
main suppliers of illegal migrants—in
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa,
as well as countries of Central Asia, the
Caucasus regions of the CIS, and Moldova.
It is possible that a certain number of them
used official channels to enter Ukraine for
further illegal transit to countries of
Western Europe. These facts stipulate the
need for quick establishment of a registra1
tion system for foreigners and their person1
al papers at ports of entry, and for the cre1
ation of corresponding electronic databases
and so on.
National priorities in regulating migration
processes should be as follows:
• completing the formation of a legislative
base for adjustment of migration
processes;
• formation and improvement of state
authority systems which are competent
in migration regulation;
• assistance for the repatriation of persons
of Ukrainian origin who appeared to be
away from Ukraine for various reasons; 
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• assistance in returning or reintegrating
into Ukraine of previously deported peo1
ples;
• providing assistance to the state for eco1
logical migrants;
• combating illegal (including transit)
migration;
• assistance to refugees and immigrants.
At the national level, it is possible to do the
following:
• Develop a National Migration Program
for –, which will be based on
national interests, general norms and
principles of international law and
human rights protection, and the norms
and principles of the European Union,
and confirm it by a corresponding Law;
• Pay special attention to the regulation of
all of forms of migration; 
• Improve the coordination activity of cen1
tral bodies of the executive government
that regulate migration processes.
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Table . Information on citizens of some countries of the world 
who officially entered Ukraine and departed from it in –
Citizenship Entered Ukraine Total
   –
Afghanistan , , , ,
Armenia , , , ,
Azerbaijan , , , ,
Bangladesh , ,  ,
China , , , ,
Georgia , , , ,
India , , , ,
Iran , , , ,
Iraq  ,  ,
Kazakhstan , , , ,
Kirgizia , , , ,
Lebanon , , , ,
Libya  , , ,
Moldova ,, ,, ,, ,,
Pakistan , , , ,
Somalia    
Sri Lanka  ,  ,
Sudan    ,
Syria , , , ,
Tajikistan , , , ,
Turkey , , , ,
Turkmenistan , , , ,
Uzbekistan , , , ,
Vietnam , , , ,
Total ,, ,, ,, ,,
Presumed number
of person that didn’t 
leave Ukraine properly , , , ,,
Source: State Committee on Frontier Security of Ukraine  
Migration and security issues are closely
connected with the problem of border pro1
tection, which is an essential function of
any state. Ukraine began to develop its bor1
der infrastructure and protection of its
borders since the first days of independ1
ence (). 
After the collapse of the former Soviet
republics, these activities were new to
Ukraine; thus, they were at first open to
uncontrolled trafficking of persons,
weapons, explosives, narcotic and poison1
ous substances, and other types of smug1
gling. Secondly, two1thirds of Ukraine’s bor1
ders (over , km) were not defined at the
national level, and as a result were not
guarded. 
These conditions, combined with the unsta1
ble situation on post1Soviet territory, as well
as the military conflicts in Transdnistria and
Transcaucasus regions, required prompt
action for the protection of Ukraine’s terri1
torial integrity. 
In particular, there is a great danger of rap1
idly growing organised crime in the follow1
ing areas:
• trafficking illegal migrants across
Ukraine’s territory;
• smuggling of weapons, ammunition,
drugs, explosives, cultural artifacts, ciga1
rettes, alcohol, and other goods.
Ineffective management of migration is not
only Ukraine’s problem. In fact, almost no
country in the world has escaped the nega1
tive influence of illegal migration, being
either a country of residence or a country of
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As was mentioned above, there is a proposal
to create a single state body that would be
responsible for migration issues; however,
we think that it is not advisable to combine
law1enforcement and humanitarian func1
tions in this sphere in one executive body. 
Assistance is needed from humanitarian
experts as well as appropriate financial sup1
port to create dormitories and places for
detainment, and to resolve the problems of
socioeconomic adaptation into society for
refugees and other persons who have
applied to receive Ukrainian citizenship. 
At the same time, law1enforcement activity
in the sphere of migration includes the
determination of a person’s status during
their stay in Ukraine, the necessary provi1
sion with passport documents and identifi1
cation cards, and influencing migration
processes by administrative actions (permis1
sions for granting temporary entry and per1
manent residence, employment, entry visas,
control of the state borders, etc.). 
The combination of humanitarian and law1
enforcement functions in one body would
lead to conflicts of interest during the con1
sideration of the legal status of applying per1
sons. 
Such an approach to improve the system of
authorities controlling the legal status of
foreigners and their legal citizen applica1
tions is in keeping with the conception of
administrative reforms in the country. This
indicates that there is not a great need to
make changes in legislation, or financial
expenditures, and it is economically expedi1
ent. In addition, it would be possible to use
the existing material and technical resource
base—with the available regular potential of
each of the abovementioned units, practical
experience, and elements of cooperation—
in combating illegal migration.
Migration and security: Harm of illegal migration
(people trafficking, especially the sex trade, drug
trafficking, etc.)
destination or transit. The main negative
impacts of illegal migration are:
• trafficking activity, which is connected
with other crimes;
• trafficking of people, organs, and body
parts, economic and sexual exploitation,
etc.;
• possibility for terrorists to enter the
country along with illegal migrants;
• organised crime activity connected with
human rights abuses, humiliation of
migrants, and corruption of law enforce1
ment officers.
Out of , migrants detained at
Ukraine’s borders, the majority was aiming
for Europe from regions of military conflict
or international terrorism; % of the
migrants were from Afghanistan, Pakistan,
India, Iraq, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka. This
information enables us to draw the conclu1
sion that these migrants were illegally trans1
ported by car or train through the territory
of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Russia, or the Caucasus.
Across the border, illegal migrants were traf1
ficked and found at the following:
• checkpoints, with forged documents or
hiding in vehicles;
• beyond checkpoints, by car or foot with
the help of an accomplice.
Attempts of illegal transfer 
to Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovakia
Ukrainian border guards detected more than
, illegal migrants last year. Among them
were , for illegal border crossings, 
while moving across the country, and more
than , were denied entry to Ukraine for
not proving the stated aim of their journey. 
New methods of illegal border crossing are
being constantly invented and carried out,
first of all through the territory of Belarus,
Moldova, and the Caucasus region and by
sea. For instance, in November  two
groups of Chinese citizens were delivered by
air from Moscow to Chisinau, and then ille1
gally transferred to Ukraine.
In January of this year,  citizens of Iraq and
Iran were delivered from Turkey in the cargo
containers of vehicles and vessels. These
examples demonstrate the capabilities of
organised crime dealing with trafficking peo1
ple within the Eurasian region. In pursuit of
huge profits, such criminals are remorseless:
• transporting illegal migrants in concealed
places of cargo vehicles for long periods
and distances;
• keeping migrants in cold, isolated build1
ings without any food;
• making them traverse mountains and
rivers, often in winter;
• leaving sick and exhausted migrants with1
out help.
As an additional example, in June of last year,
 persons were detained attempting to get
into Hungary in a concealed space in the ceil1
ing of a truck. The height of the ceiling space
was  cm; there were  children among the
detainees, aged from . to  years, and
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Chart . Migrants
Source: State Committee on Frontier Security of Ukraine  
 women. In –, trafficking of chil1
dren with forged documents was discovered
on the following routes:
• by air through airports of Kyiv to coun1
tries of Western Europe;
• by rail to Romania, Hungary, and
Slovakia.
To prevent this illicit activity and punish crim1
inals who are responsible for such acts, it is
necessary to take joint action with European
community law enforcement bodies, and to
request assistance, if necessary, from their
agencies.
The abovementioned allows us to draw the
following conclusion:
The flow of illegal migrants is fully controlled
by organised powerful and capable interna1
tional crime groups. For illegal trafficking of
migrants from Southeast Asia, the Middle
East, and African countries they use both
legal channels (tourism, studying, service or
private purposes of travel) and sectors of the
“green” border and sea routes.
Constant changes in the directions and
methods of trafficking are observed.
Inadequate legislation and the lack of coor1
dination and proper equipment are widely
exploited factors in this activity. 
Measures taken in past years have brought
positive results, although there have been
many problems. Drugs, weapons, means of
terrorism and subversion, illegal traffick1
ing of tobacco, alcohol, electronic equip1
ment, and export of antiques all continue
to present a considerable threat to national
security. Illegal goods found by Ukrainian
border guards over the last ten years
include:
• guns – more than ,;
• ammunition over . million;
• narcotics – about  tons; 
• various goods worth over  million
euros.
Judging from the variety of illegal migra1
tion and illegal transportation of goods
across the state border, we can conclude
that there is a great need to devise and
implement joint actions and measures of
European Community to stop the negative
activities.
Migration processes that have taken place in
Ukraine during – prove that
Ukraine is actively participating in world
migration processes.
A characteristic feature of migration is its
adaptability; the character and structure of
migration flows according to the political,
ecological, socio1economic situation in
Ukraine and abroad.
Foreign migration is one of the greatest and
most importance issues for migration condi1
tions in Ukraine. During the period from
 to , about . million migrants
were recorded, including about . million
entering Ukraine, and about . million
people leaving.
About half of all persons who entered the
country in – were basically from the
countries of the former Soviet Union. During
–, Ukraine established a migratory
surplus. In  this surplus was the great1
est—over ,.
The mass migration into Ukraine in the early
s was due to repatriation. Due to the pop1
ulation migration of Ukraine during the first
few years of independence, the demographics
increased in number, regardless of the
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Migration flows (national and regional perspective)
Ukraine has confirmed its irrevocable
European choice and welcomes the expan1
sion of the EU, considering it to be impor1
tant factor that has strategic significance for
decrease of natural population growth, which
reached . million in . This only reaf1
firms repatriation as an integral part of the
migration situation in Ukraine; therefore,
repatriation facilitation must be focused on as
a priority of the migratory policy of Ukraine. 
Since , entry into Ukraine has continu1
ously decreased. Since , migration reduc1
tion was apparent, which accounts for the pre1
vailing number of persons who left over those
who entered. The process is continuously
ongoing. The peak was in , which can be
explained by the socioeconomic situation in
Ukraine at that time. Due to the considerable
reduction in persons entering Ukraine,
despite the high indication of a migration sur1
plus in the early ’s, an overall migration
reduction took place in –. The num1
ber of people left also decreased. As a result of
migration during this period, the population
of Ukraine decreased by , persons.
Up to  January this year in Ukraine, the sta1
tus of refugee was granted to , persons,
among whom were citizens of  different
countries. Presently in Ukraine there are
, persons who had to leave their places of
permanent residence in Abkhazia and
Georgia and entered Ukraine.
Due to the complex economic situation in
Ukraine, many Ukrainian citizens leave in
search of jobs. According to official data, in the
previous year the number of Ukrainian citizens
who temporary worked abroad was ,, and
the number of foreigners and stateless persons
who temporarily worked in Ukraine was ,.
Analysis of interstate labour migration reveals
the necessity of setting up protection systems
that work abroad to defend Ukrainian interests
and legally regulate the exploitation of working
foreign forces in Ukraine. 
An acute problem of illegal migration to
Ukraine and on through Ukraine requires
prompt counteraction of these processes.
Migration analysis shows that the number of
persons leaving Ukraine is larger than the
number of persons entering Ukraine. Thus,
the government should take an interest in
people entering Ukraine (businesspeople,
tourists, students, etc.). All this shows the
importance of state migration management,
which should be implemented by shaping
and pursuing the migration policy of the
state. 
Nowadays, there are many unsolved ques1
tions in the area of state migration manage1
ment. Drawbacks to the implementation of
state migration legislation have to be elimi1
nated by strengthening national control over
enforcement of the law and coordinated
efforts of governmental agencies in this
regard.
It is also necessary to adopt legal acts which
would settle many unsolved questions,
namely: encouraging repatriation of people
of Ukrainian origin and their offspring;
return to the historic motherland people of
who were deported from the territory of
Ukraine because of national background;
establishment of a legal, social, and econom1
ic basis for the management of external
migration of labour; provision of assistance
to refugees and asylum seekers; and control
over the immigration to Ukraine of foreign1
ers and persons without citizenship.
For Ukraine, it is important to adopt inter1
national mechanisms of migration manage1
ment. It will be helpful for migrants and for
the state that has to harmonise its legislation
with the proper European legislation in the
framework of European integration process.
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Upcoming management issues 
regarding the Eastern EU Border 
Europe’s future and objectively leads to the
appearance of broad possibilities in cooper1
ation between Ukraine and the EU.
At the same time, expansion of the EU will
affect Ukraine’s cooperation with present EU
candidate countries. As a result, EU expan1
sion could lead to negative consequences for
Ukraine, and the prospects of Ukraine’s
cooperation with an expanded EU are vague.
In order to strengthen the strategic partner1
ship and cooperation between Ukraine and
the EU, we suggest that the discussion of the
EU expansion issue be continued with a
view to minimising its possible negative con1
sequences for Ukraine, under the frame1
work of joint EU dialogue based on the
Partnership and Co1operation Agreement,
as well as multilateral and bilateral relations
with certain member countries and candi1
date countries.
Introduction of relevant restrictions as a
result of extension of the Schengen
Agreement into new states will affect
Ukraine in the following ways:
• The number of illegal migrants will
increase (by about %) as a result of
immigration control intensification by
adjacent states at the western borders,
and also due to the underdeveloped east1
ern border infrastructure; 
• Preconditions will occur for Ukraine to
become a country that accumulates illegal
migrants rather than experiencing their
transit, as a result of an increase in detain1
ment, custody, and extradition expenses,
as well as aggravation of criminal activity
in Ukraine, concentration of illegal
migrants in specific regions, change of
ethnic situation, and noticeable discrep1
ancy between national1cultural interests
of the local population and of migrants;
• Discontent of the Polish and
Hungarian minorities in Ukraine will
grow, as a result of the strict visa
regime, which could lead to negative
migration and other tendencies inside
the minorities;
• Conditions for business cooperation,
especially small business, will be more
complicated, which can result in a par1
tial decline of economic relations, the
number of citizens travelling across the
border, as well as cultural exchange,
tourism, living standards, and growth in
social tension among the population of
western border regions of Ukraine; 
• Access of workers from Ukraine to the
labour markets of new member1states
will be restricted; and problems with
employing Ukraine’s citizens in these
countries will occur.
• Continuation of active cooperation with
the EU in the context of liberalisation of
visa regimes, namely, cancellation of visa
requirements for diplomatic and govern1
ment passport owners going to the EU,
simplifications of visa issuing proce1
dures, and issuing long1term visas for
certain categories of Ukrainian citizens;
• EU adoption of a common policy as to
third1country citizens, aimed at the pre1
vention of illegal migration, that will pro1
mote cooperation of Ukraine with EU
structures, as well as EU assistance in the
arrangement of points of accumulation
and return of illegal migrants to their
homelands;
• EU assistance in the improvement of
logistics at eastern and northern borders
of Ukraine, as well as resolving the prob1
lem of extradition funding; 
• working out measures for the prevention
of negative consequences of visa regimes
via the involvement of Ukraine’s experts
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Possible ways out
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under the framework of Ukraine1EU
cooperation on visa issues;
• development of joint projects that would
promote the competitiveness of
Ukrainian workers, facilitate solving the
problems of unemployment and social
protection of employed migrants, taking
into account the intensified adjustment
of Ukraine’s labour legislation in line
with EU standards, as well as participa1
tion in ILO and EU Conventions on the
legal and social protection of employed
migrants;
• development of border cooperation,
especially implementation of technical
assistance projects under the framework
of Тасіs programs;
• fulfilling the priority of Ukraine—associ1
ate (and then full) EU membership. 
Presently, as a result of newly appeared EU
members, the western borders of Ukraine
will become the EU’s eastern borders. This
requires the activation of efforts aimed at
the reinforcement of eastern and northern
border guards.
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Analysis of the migration situation in
Ukraine, as well as the processes of estab1
lishing and developing state migration man1
agement agencies, clearly shows inadequa1
cies. Migration processes are developing
faster than the agencies which should exe1
cute control over these processes. In such
circumstances, there is a danger of uncon1
trolled migration in Ukraine.
As a result, in  Ukrainian legislation
gave much attention to developing migra1
tion regulations and a relevant legal policy.
It is necessary to study international experi1
ence at this stage. The legal basic instru1
ments of migration management have
already been worked out. Hence, interna1
tional cooperation and introduction of
world migration management tendencies
should be an important part of Ukrainian
migration policy.
Migration management acts are inadequate
because of the imperfection of migration
policy. Further development of migration
legislation in Ukraine requires not only
intensive activity aimed at completion of
adopting necessary acts, but systematisation
of them as well. Agency regulations need to
be further developed and systematised.
Close attention must be drawn to the prob1
lem of illegal migration. Its increase threat1
ens society and requires legal and organisa1
tional regulation. There are more problems
and “grey areas” in the area of migration
management, which need to be resolved
legally.
Conclusions and recommendations 
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Implementation of Schengen –
direct influence on socioeconomic
reality in Ukraine
Oleksandr SAFIN
At the same time, we should not expect any
shrinkage in the number of Ukrainians who
migrate for temporary employment.
Estimates of Western experts show that almost
two million Ukrainian workers are currently
illegally employed across Western European
countries (data of the Federal Agency of
Refugees’ Affairs alone reports that Germany
has from , to ,, illegal workers,
of which Ukrainians make up the majority).
Nowadays, this kind of employment is broad1
ly practiced, regardless of the boom in adver1
tising of employment by contract in the
neighbouring countries, as well as the far
abroad, including Western Europe
(Holland, France, Norway, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, and Greece are among the tradi1
tional choices). After the expiration of their
employment contracts, many Ukrainians
resolve to stay there illegally, unwilling to
come back till the situation has improved at
home (e.g., unofficial data discloses that cur1
rently over , Ukrainians are working
illegally in Portugal). Their hourly rate of
five to eight deutsche marks, against fifty to
eighty deutsche marks for a national worker,
is too tempting a bargain to turn down, even
for law1abiding burghers. According to data
presented by the German department of sta1
tistics, , jobs are mislaid every year in
Germany due to the “dumping” of “black
labour”, and the shadow economy looks
more and more like an organised crime syn1
dicate.
In the meantime, for new signatories of the
Schengen Treaty, the movement of transit
workers (let alone those who intend to drop
the anchor in these countries) presents prob1
lems, as well. For instance, Germany is expe1
riencing a real deficit in such rare profes1
sions as computer technologies, engineers,
medical attendants, truck drivers, hotel
managers, and service workers, for which
there is an acute demand by the economies
of these countries. Such demand naturally
boosts supply. Moreover, the Bundestag is
seeking opportunities to legalize the work of
Ukrainian employees and other workers like
them in these professional fields.
Another assumption we should not strike off
the list is that the vexation of many Polish
and Hungarian minorities in Ukraine at the
introduced visa regime can prompt more
intensive migration trends among them.
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Effects on Schengen
implementation
Employment migration
The execution of the Schengen Treaty—above all, by the countries sharing their
frontiers with Ukraine (they are Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia)—will certainly
affect the dynamics of frontier movement. The foremost reaction to the introduced
visa regime, as well as other organisational measures, will cut short the number
of people travelling to their Western neighbours on tourist trips, visiting relatives,
or for retail purposes. The problem is not in the need of opening departments of
general consulates (e.g., in Berehovo and Nyiregyhaza), with assistance granted
from Brussels to ensure timely and accurate visa arrangements, but in the fact
that the living standards of the bulk of travellers will fail to offset the additional
expenditures of obtaining visas 
Whereas Western Europe, when picking up
the gauntlets thrown down by international
globalization, unlike other regional blocks,
approaches more earnestly the measures
needed to protect it from negative eco1
nomic, demographic, ecological, and polit1
ical implications, then it makes sense that
forming a European trade and economic
block, competitive compared to the
American and Eastern1Asiatic ones,
requires additional labour force, a fact
which can aggravate xenophobia, ultrana1
tionalism, as well as competition in the
labour market across EU countries.
Simultaneously, the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement that came into
effect exactly four years ago between
Ukraine and the EU is aimed at trade liber1
alization, based on the conclusion that free
trade encourages economic development
of the country. Therefore, if the EU is inter1
ested in the development of Ukraine’s
economy, and not only in the openness of
the Ukrainian market, for some time it will
have to reconcile itself to a certain asym1
metry of their trade relations.
Along with that, we should not underesti1
mate the fact that more vigorous marketing
of Western goods in Ukraine has sure
chances to cause damage to whole cities
and regions producing similar goods, and
real incomes of individuals employed in
the national industry will most likely drop,
due to the need to curtail expenditures
under the conditions of fierce competi1
tion. Neither should the threat be discard1
ed of being forced to decrease prices due
to the inflow of more attractive (by quality
and other parameters) goods from the EU,
which will eventually force Ukrainian pro1
ducers to shut down. As a result of this,
shrinkage of domestic market capacity is
probable, which will further aggravate
competition and speed up the bankruptcy
of small1 and medium1size businesses, and
automatically entail adverse consequences
in society.
It should be mentioned that some steps
towards the implementation of the above1
mentioned treaty have already become
somewhat controversial. When suggesting
As far as the circulation of goods is con1
cerned, we have all the reasons to claim that
the decisive factor will be the quality of
extant legislation, manufacturers, and auto
carriers to the new reality, dynamics and vol1
umes of investment in all respects.
The decision adopted by Ukraine’s govern1
ment to abolish duties collected at frontier
oblasts for traversing their territory is
regarded as a positive factor. The law adopt1
ed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 
 February  exempted Polish carriers
from paying road fees throughout
Ukrainian territory.
As is well known, the governments of
neighbouring countries are discussing the
issue of expanding the Ukrainian1Polish
international Baltic–Black Sea corridor
(Gdansk, Gdynia–Odesa, Illichivsk,
Southern ports).
Negative effects 
Among the negative effects, we should
emphasize that over the last six years
Ukraine has curtailed six1fold capital
investments into road maintenance (up to
 million USD per annum), which grad1
ually makes them unattractive for foreign,
especially private, transport and incurs
annual losses of – billion USD in addi1
tional receipts to the state budget of
Ukraine.
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reinforcing economic cooperation with
Ukraine, the first thing the EU suggests to
focus on is nuclear security. The Presidency
Conclusions Annex V. —Part II,  sets forth
that nuclear security and shutting down the
Chornobyl nuclear power plant is a priority
in EU1Ukraine relations. Meanwhile, the
“common strategy” only cursorily mentions
the real strategic value of Ukraine for the
EU—the Black Sea region.
We may assume that in the nearest future,
trade volumes will not be prone to surges,
because the markets of the countries that
are new signatories to the Schengen Treaty
and are largely having a Western orienta1
tion will not alter dramatically their vector—
that is one side of the coin. On the other
side, recent statements made by the
President of Ukraine during his stay in
Khant1Mansiisk concerning the insular
character of the EU emphasize even
stronger the pro1Russian accents of the
Ukrainian trade policy vector. Apart from
this, the pace with which Ukrainian pro1
duction slogs towards European standards
is dramatically lower than the similar indi1
cator in the Western neighbours of
Ukraine. If we take a recent acknowledge1
ment made by the Ukrainian President that
the national economic model approaches
most closely that of Latin America (as is well
known, roughly half of it is “in the shadow”)
than the European one, we cannot disre1
gard that their new economic situation will
make the new signatories of the Schengen
Treaty resort to additional protectionism
against dumping by Ukrainian producers.
Problems with liberalising the trade regime
and barriers in bilateral trade that charac1
terise Ukraine’s neighbours, particularly
Poland, will remain as they are as a conse1
quence a multilevel configuration change
of the nearest and mid1term priorities of
each of these countries for years to come.
Traditionally, according to EU operating
rules, where two1thirds of major goods flows
(export1import) are concentrated within
the union itself, we should expect that as
new members gradually join their ranks,
the external balance in bilateral trade will
be to the detriment of Ukraine for quite a
lengthy period.
As far as trade relations with Hungary are
concerned, where recently a steady rising
trend of bilateral circulation of goods has
been forged, with  volumes reaching
 million USD, herein we can spot the
formation of mechanisms that would miti1
gate the implications of Hungary joining
the European Association and signing the
Schengen Treaty. On average, roughly ,
contracts are concluded annually between
Hungarian and Ukrainian enterprises,
among which the share of small1 and medi1
um1size ones is rising. Apart from this, the
Hungarian party at least declared its inten1
tions after EU accession, that is, to assume
an essential role in implementing the EU
strategy with respect to Ukraine itself. The
initiative manifested by Hungary, which
chairs the Visegrad four, will serve this pur1
pose and will also facilitate Ukraine’s inte1
gration to Europe and will reinforce coop1
eration between the Visegrad four and
Ukraine.
Simultaneously, the EU is a commonwealth
of states which have united to withstand
tough global competition by consolidating
their efforts. Objectively speaking, at the
moment when new members are arriving,
they will not be openly interested in
Ukrainian goods being available in their
markets. And the increasing with each year
share of Ukrainian exports that are subject
to anti1dumping investigations is the evi1
dence of this fact. On the whole, Ukraine’s
low1key profile in foreign1trade relation1
ships with the EU again proves that major
export sectors of the Ukrainian economy
(metallurgy, textile industry, and agricultur1
al complex) do not belong here for the time
being. There can be no talk about econom1
ically weighty joint projects like that of the
An1 cargo plane, which was rejected by
EU countries for purely political reasons.
Additionally, the majority of Ukraine’s eco1
nomic sectors are actually non1competitive
in world markets, and unattractive for
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investing. This results from their huge pro1
duction costs compared to those of Western
Europe, America, and Asia, triggered by
geo1climatic realia, and, correspondingly,
the smaller profitability of these sectors.
This leads some of our experts to accentu1
ate the necessity of a “reasonable distanc1
ing” from the international economic sys1
tem. This fact gives Ukrainian politicians
reasons to make off1putting (as it may seem
to most onlookers) manoeuvres or, being
more exact, to vacillate between the East—
Russia—and the West, and occasionally
towards the USA). To a certain extent, this
phenomenon mirrors the opposing prefer1
ences of the Ukrainian population ("Left
Bank”—towards Russia, “Right Bank”—
towards the West). Taking into considera1
tion socio1cultural factors, the government
of the country was obliged to supplement
its “European choice” with a “strategic part1
nership” with Russia, which takes up % of
all Ukrainian exports (a factor of economic
dependency). At the scientific1empirical
conference “Socio1cultural Factors of
Developing the Intellectual Potential of
Society and Youth” () held in Kyiv, for1
mer President of Ukraine Leonid
Kravchuk, noted that Ukraine should cease
straying along the “USA–Russia–Western
European Bermuda triangle”. This is all the
more proof of the fact that the power1wield1
ing state managers have not yet agreed as to
the principal vector of their foreign policy.
Apart from the above1said, we still should
admit that further EU economic integra1
tion, apart from non1apparent benefits,
bears a threat to many Ukrainian enterpris1
es spilling over from European corpora1
tions, which ultimately will impose on
Ukraine an increased unemployment rate,
fiercer competition between Ukrainian pro1
ducers and enterprises of new EU members
in the common market of the European
Union, and tighter economic and political
pressure exerted over Ukraine with respect
to the openness of the Ukrainian market to
EU producers.
Thus, despite the external motivational
similarity of economic developments in
Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia
aimed at improving the welfare of their
population, from the intentional viewpoint,
anticipated EU enlargement will most likely
disintegrate these countries rather than
integrate them. On the one hand, the his1
torically high level of private consumption
in Eastern European countries can block
the necessity of moderateness and restraint
dictated by economic circumstances. On
the other hand, Western entrepreneurs
endeavour to limit the sphere of produc1
tion activities of CIS countries, particularly
in Ukraine, through issuance of low1valued
primary products and semi1finished prod1
ucts, let alone goods produced by most
Eastern European firms are not in demand
with in the Western markets (it looks like
quite a few of them are incapable of meet1
ing the needs of Western consumers). It is
obvious that this fact will determinably
affect the growth of scepticism in Ukraine.
Along with that, it should not be discount1
ed that in the light of such reasoning the
value of Russia as a resource for Ukraine
will lie not so much in inexpensive energy
carriers and the potential market of domes1
tic products as in the desire and capacity
displayed by Russia to conduct an expansive
policy in foreign (read: Ukrainian) markets.
By and large, the Ukrainian economy still
remains hostage to the systemic manage1
ment crisis, which objectively aggravates the
gap between Ukraine and Western countries
(foreign debt aggregates nearly % of GDP,
the GNP subsists on exports, huge receiv1
able ( billion UAH) and payable ( bil1
lion UAH) accounts, lack of economic free1
dom, etc.). The threat of dropping out of
economic relationships also aggravates due
to the fact that Ukraine’s market structure is
utterly primitive, the banking system is
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underdeveloped ( banks against  in
England, guarantees in case of bankruptcy
are scanty; loans in hard currency are expen1
sive—.%; inflation (.% in ) is being
stifled with the lack of funds, which amounts
to merely % of GDP versus the required
–%), credit resources are tight, and
export capital is limited, which cannot help
acting as curbing factors in teaming up the
EU and Ukrainian economies. The major
items of Ukraine’s exports still comprise
products of non1restructured sectors, as well
as material1, labour1, and energy1intensive
sectors—this fact that casts doubts over the
reliability and stability of economic growth.
Yet more evidence of prudence exerted by
Western financial circles is the fact that over
the decade of independence, Ukraine
received merely . billion USD of foreign
direct investments, while Hungary obtained
 billion USD, and  billion USD were
injected into Poland.
The social life of frontier communities,
which primarily depends on the degree of
“frontier transparency” (“soft” and “hard”
smuggling, other subsistence sources)
(factor ), on the one hand, and the devel1
opment degree of local industry (factor ),
on the other hand, is undergoing percep1
tible changes. No doubt that the effect of
factor  will trigger adverse implications,
that is, deteriorated levels of social life of
frontier people. The effect of factor , as
we expect, will be low1key either way,
because the frontier industry is of low
capacity, focused on satisfying local needs
and principally acting as a raw1material
appendage of national monopolists.
Along with that, we should keep in mind
that the majority of sectors of national
industry have huge production costs—dou1
ble that of their neighbours. Additionally,
taking into consideration the imbalance
in the  State Budget, political instabil1
ity, a high level of corruption of state struc1
tures, the current state of the legal field
and institutional infrastructure, and con1
ditions for developing national small and
medium businesses, which retains risky
transactions in the domestic market, then
for a certain period the frontier industry
will remain unattractive from the view1
point of foreign investors or creditors, and
new foreign investments will have no sig1
nificance for the regional, not to mention
the national, economy.
It is worthwhile indicating that when deter1
mining the importance of frontier cooper1
ation, specifically in the economic sector,
the economy ministries of Ukraine and
Hungary made commitments to jointly
develop the frontier area, which undoubt1
edly conforms with the European principle
“To an integrated Europe via regional
development” (with the definition of
“region” being considered not only as part
of the country, but also as a unity of lands of
several countries). It is known that
European organisations grant assistance to
such associations, financial assistance as
well, seeing it as a way to maximally
mobilise local resources to create a real
market economy.
Based on the fact that in the Ukrainian1
Hungarian border area, interests in the
socio1economic development of both that
part of southern Ukraine together with
south1eastern Hungary and international
financial groups converge (also because
the fifth transport corridor traverses the
region), experts perceive an opportunity to
attract . billion USD in investments to
develop this region. Principally, it would be
essential to establish joint ventures there,
and effectively utilise the free economic
zones—both Ukrainian and Hungarian
ones. These joint ventures and financial1
trading groups would be Ukraine’s door1
way to European markets when Hungary
accedes to the EU.
Apart from this, it should be acknowledged
that the utilisation of Ukraine’s scientific
and technical potential is beneficial for
Hungary as well as for Ukraine. We can site
as an example the fact that Ukrainian
enterprises are actively working in the
Hungarian sphere of nuclear power (addi1
tionally, Ukrainians partook in re1equip1
ping an electric power station that stands in
the world’s top ten safest such stations).
Another example of a successful joint enter1
prise is the Gedeon1Richter Pharma1ceuti1
cal Plant, whose products are in demand in
Ukraine thanks to their guaranteed quality
and moderate price. The launch of a large1
scale, as opposed to one1off, application of
Hungary’s advanced processing technolo1
gies, which generate negligible post1pro1
duction wastes, to process agricultural raw
material in Ukraine, would be bound to
succeed.
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Therefore, introducing a tighter regime for
Ukrainian migrants and reinforcing protec1
tionism measures with regard to restructur1
ing the local labour market in countries
neighbouring to Ukraine, as well as a signif1
icant reduction of opportunities to support
its living standards at the expense of border
trade, smuggling will boost both the regis1
tered unemployment (. million people
and, according to official data, in  it will
increase by .%, while in border areas, this
indicator is much higher—every tenth regis1
tered jobless person in Ukraine lives in Lviv
oblast, and the highest unemployment rate
is in Volyn oblast) and non1official unem1
ployment rate in the frontier area, which
will undoubtedly generate extra tension.
During his visit to Ukraine, the President of
The Board of the Transport Ministry has
implemented a number of additional meas1
ures; namely, a five1year Complex Program to
Boost Transport Infrastructure has been
designed to inject  million USD of capital
investments, of which  million USD will
be from the budget, and the rest from credit,
investment resources, and enterprise funds.
This will allow to facilitate the expansion of
the river port in Chop for cargo transporta1
tion up and down the Tysa (Tisza) River,
modernisation of the No. international
transport corridor, the Chop–Kyiv M 
highway, as well as re1opening of the
Solotvyn–Velyki Bychky and Yasynia–State
Border railway links.
And investment in the medium1 and long1
term programs on socio1economic regional
development,—drafted by the government
back in  specifically for the Carpathian
region, Lviv city, and the mountain territory
of Rakhiv, Transcarpathia oblast,—is prob1
lematic due to the constantly deformed
budget; because of limited financial
resources only –% of the necessary
funds are disbursed. Simultaneously, it is
not the first year that the recovery of damage
caused by natural disasters to border areas,
specifically on the Ukrainian side, has not
been fully executed.
It is hardly worthwhile to hope for solid for1
eign investments (it is well known that this
per1capita indicator for Ukraine is the low1
est among the Eastern European countries).
On the one hand, the phenomenon of flight
of domestic capital abroad is widespread in
Ukraine. Keeping in mind that EU acces1
sion by Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary will
strengthen one way or another confidence
of Ukrainians in them as in EU members,
the flight of Ukrainian capital to these coun1
tries is bound to intensify. On the other
hand, in the wake of countless bureaucratic
hurdles, foreign investors will keep Ukraine
in mind only as an important future market,
and in the nearest future will not make use
of its principal advantage—the comparative1
ly inexpensive but qualified and diligent
workforce.
Developments of recent years include 
differentiation of socio1economic develop1
ment and regional resource potential, estab1
lishing local self1government, application of
different instruments of public policy and
economic regulation, which primarily
affected Transcarpathia, Lviv, and Volyn, as
well as Kirovohrad oblasts, whose economy
has witnessed the most severe plunge—by
–%, down to the  level. The econo1
my of these, as well as the additional seven1
teen oblasts of Ukraine almost entirely relies
on the conditions in one or two production
sectors. Here, the level of wages is lower
than average throughout Ukraine—which,
apropos, totaled  USD [monthly] com1
pared to  USD in the neighbouring
Poland.
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Hungary’s statement that the country’s gov1
ernment managed to curtail the unemploy1
ment rate by .% last year and that it would
continue was indirect proof of the gloomy
prospects awaiting Ukrainians living in bor1
der areas.
It should be stated that in the course of
the last five years, Ukraine’s criminal situ1
ation, particularly in border regions, has
worsened considerably; criminal group1
ings have started to integrate more vigor1
ously into criminal syndicates. The crimi1
nal world has waged an all1out offensive on
the interests and security of Ukraine’s
state borders. The limited financial1eco1
nomic and resource opportunities of the
state regarding proper maintenance of the
border troops, State Customs Service
( financing will be at the level of
–% of overall needs) have prompted
tense opposition between the intensified
frontier problems and limited opportuni1
ties to solve them (additionally, it should
be noted that approximately % of
Ukraine’s state frontier are not provided
appropriate customs and frontier control).
This prompts the introduction a set of
measures to form regional zones of fron1
tier security, to establish coordination in
space and concerted efforts of all execu1
tive bodies that deal with problems in the
frontier sphere.
Smuggling will be subjected to stringent
measures exerted by law1enforcement
agencies of new signatories to the
Schengen Treaty, on the one hand, and
as for Ukraine, it will refine its forms and
methods, continuing to pose problems
to Ukraine’s economy, remaining a shad1
ow rival of the national industry and dis1
torting overall economic indicators at
the regional, as well as at the national
levels.
Low living standards and poor social secu1
rity of most societal groups in Ukraine
(survey data, conducted in  by SOCIS
reveal that only % of Ukrainians
assessed their life as satisfactory), quite a
few able1bodied population in frontier
regions not engaged in socially useful work
is a potential epicentre for illegal deeds at
the frontier. Thus, over six months in
, the number of detainees in
Ukraine’s frontier regions grew, with
accomplices, couriers, and assistants of
illegal migrants. For the bulk of the popu1
lation, especially on the Hungarian stretch
of the frontier, helping trespassers has
become a kind of tradition and a primary
method of earning one’s living.
Cushy ways of earning some extra cash
engaging in “fishy” transactions (including
illegal migrants), and corruption levels on
the border, despite largely nothing more
than administrative measures employed to
fight the latter, and the formation of
robust national as well as transnational
criminal structures on both sides of the
frontier, which were established over the
last years and have learned how to become
clandestine, do not inspire with optimism
for the nearest future. Thus, for instance, a
clandestine wine1making industry in
Hungary, hemp1growing, opium poppy1
growing, and production of synthetic drug
raw material using the cheap land and
labour force of Ukraine, will remain some
of the principal sources of smuggling.
Presently, smuggling activity across bor1
ders is getting more organized and crimi1
nal, with the number of large parties smug1
gled goods seized (over , UAH)
jumping four1fold. The results of militant
activities of the Frontier Army in  tes1
tify to the fact that smuggling across the
State Border remains high, regardless of
the measures applied, and does not display
any downward trends. Thus, compared to
 the number of expropriated goods
which crossed the border illegally rose by
. times.
The level of illegal activities on the
Ukrainian1Polish border remains high;
 policy studies #, JANUARY 
Smuggling 
the number of detained smuggled goods
grew by . times and value of the goods
rose by . times. During , more than
once huge batches of cigarettes, which
were intended to be delivered West under
faked documents, were detained.
Actually, almost % of the goods (by val1
ues) were halted when attempting to
remove them from Ukraine. As earlier,
spirits, cigarettes, non1ferrous metals,
currency and antiques, as well as CDs con1
tinue to be exported from Ukraine; food1
stuffs and packaging materials are import1
ed. The increased number of cigarettes
should be attributed to the more thor1
ough inspection of cargo trucks; as a con1
sequence, the instances of large quanti1
ties of detained smuggled goods have
increased. It is not accidental that cur1
rently Ukraine is justifiably regarded by
Europe as the country supplying ciga1
rettes to “black markets”.
Smugglers’ tactics have not altered. Goods
are removed from Ukraine usually in small
batches clandestinely, and imported, on
the contrary, in bulk under faked docu1
ments or disguising them as cargo. Along
with that, cases of detainment by the tax
police in Lviv oblast of huge batches of
foodstuffs, illegally imported from Poland,
show that there are channels for their ille1
gal import. The functioning of these chan1
nels is actually impossible without the
assistance of controlling agency workers at
checkpoints.
According to our estimates, soon the num1
ber of detentions in this particular frontier
area will somewhat drop, following the vig1
orous measures executed by the Polish
side throughout regions bordering
Ukraine to block the illegal import of spir1
its. However, the number of cases of
attempted illegal imports of goods to
Ukraine will not diminish; moreover,
smugglers will seek more actively to enlist
the services of controlling agency employ1
ees.
Analysis shows that smuggling activity has
gradually spread to the Hungarian frontier
region, where the number of detentions
increased by . times, and the cost of
goods seized jumped by . times. Further
on, we believe that the level of illegal activ1
ities in this area will be rising, a fact that
can be attributed to both the above rea1
sons and the high unemployment rate,
particularly of the Transcarpathian popu1
lation.
. Polish region: Shehyni1Medyka; Rava1
Ruska1Hrebenne; Krakovets1Korczewo;
Mostyska1Przemysl.
. Slovak region: Uzhhorod1Vysche1
Nemetske; Chop1Czerna on the Tisza;
M.Bereznyi1Ublia.
. Hungarian region: Chop1Zahon;
Luzhanka1Beregsuran; Vylok1Tysabec. 
Volyn oblast
Imports: sugar, agricultural produce, miner1
al fertilisers, spare parts, automobiles (%),
gasoline, diesel fuel, non1ferrous metals
(%), currency, and household goods.
Exports: cigarettes, wines and cigarettes,
non1ferrous metals (%), auto spare parts
(%), antiques.
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Major types of goods (import/export) across oblasts
Additionally, right on the border , wea1
pons ( units in ), , units of
ammunition (, units in ),
,. kg of drugs (. kg in ),
and . kg of explosives (. kg in )
were discovered and seized.
Additionally,  detected and arrested
hijacked automobiles the valued at . mil1
lion UAH were detained, the lion’s share of
them (%) on the borders with Poland,
Hungary, and. Slovakia. All in all, % of
weapons, % of ammunition, .% of
Activities of the border guards aimed at
counteracting smuggling activities continue
to be preventive. Most goods illegally cross1
ing the border (%) were arrested while
attempting to bring them into Ukraine, with
this indicator rising by % compared to
the previous year. According to analysis, ille1
gal activities of goods crossing the border
intensified throughout almost all frontier
stretches, particularly, in the Slovak region
(by .%), the Polish one (by .%), and
the Russian area as well.
All in all, in  the Frontier Guards detected
and seized goods and cargoes illegally crossing
the border valued at . million UAH, which
is . times higher than the previous year
(. million UAH), (See Table ).
Lviv oblast
Exports: cigarettes, vodka, CDs, precious
metals, icons, currency, shoes, non1ferrous
metals, antiques.
Transcarpathian oblast
Bordering Slovakia:
Imports: currency (%)
Exports: cigarettes, spirits, CDs, currency
(%)
Bordering Hungary
Imports: household goods, manufactured
goods, clothes, and agricultural produce
Exports: cigarettes, cars, non1ferrous met1
als, and antiques.
The volume of detained goods increased,
as well; in particular, fuels and lubricants
skyrocketed by  times, sugar grew by
. times, auto machinery and spare parts
rose three1fold, and video and audio
equipment picked up three1fold. An
impressive increase in the volumes of
detained fuels and lubricants was trig1
gered by the higher excise imposed on
them, which pushed them almost twice as
high, and by their diminished supplies
from Russia.
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Table . Goods and cargoes detected and seized by the Frontier Guards
in  
Goods/cargoes Quantity
Spirits and alcoholic beverages over  thous litres
Sugar over  t
Tobacco products over , mln packets
Fuels and lubricants over  thous litres
Meat&meat products over  t
Flour over  t
CDs over  thous items
Non1ferrous metals over  t
Precious metals over  kilograms 
Source: State Committee on Frontier Security of Ukraine  
The effectiveness of border guards
drugs, and % of goods were arrested on
the frontier’s western area.
The results of operational activities of
Ukrainian law1enforcement agencies in 
show that the number of arrests on the State
Border of drugs jumped by . times, and
their weight grew seven1fold. The largest party
of drugs was detected and seized on the bor1
der with Moldova—% of the total quantity
(in —%); while % came from Russia
(%), and % came from Belarus (%).
Over % of drugs were detected and
seized while attempting to import them to
Ukraine or grown in frontier raions to be
consumed in Ukraine (only % in ).
The most frequent drugs/narcotics include
poppy straws, cannabis, marijuana, etc.
Therefore, while the eastern area of the
state border will long remain transparent
enough for goods, weaponry, etc. to pene1
trate to the territory of Ukraine due to the
lack of funds, it will be highly tempting to
supply them to Western consumers abroad.
Thus, conclusions drawn from the results
of counteracting illegal movements of
tobacco goods across the State Border of
Ukraine show that in  over . mil1
lion cigarette packets were seized while
attempting to illegally bring them across
the State Border, which is % less than the
previous year. Almost % of tobacco
goods were arrested while attempting to
illegally import them to Ukraine, in partic1
ular, from Russia and Moldova.
On the western border region we see a ten1
dency to export cigarettes, because prices for
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Drugs 
(kg)
Arrests 
(incidents)
Chart . Drugs arrestsChart . Dynamic of detained
goods in frontier regions over
–
Source: State Committee on Frontier Security of Ukraine  Source: State Committee on Frontier Security of Ukraine  
Source: State Committee on Frontier Security of Ukraine  
Chart . Seizure of cigarettes 
on the State Border 
over – (thousands 
of packets)
• Differences in prices for goods.
• The lack of flexible and timely customs
and excise price regulation.
• No reliable border established between
Ukraine and the Russian Federation and
between Ukraine and Belarus.
• No effective seizure mechanism of arrest1
ed smuggled goods.
• No liability envisaged for carriers.
• Lack of advance information about
smuggled goods crossing the border,
including huge shipments/batches.
• Lack of an efficient tracking system over
delivered cargoes to the destination,
transit crossing of the territory of
cigarettes in the countries of the European
Community and other Central European
countries are several times higher than in
Ukraine. Furthermore, these are filter ciga1
rettes, usually of well1known brands. Thus,
tobacco goods are illegally imported to
Ukraine from Russia and Moldova largely to
be sold in Ukraine and exported to Poland,
Slovakia, and Hungary. Irregardless the fact
that % of cigarettes are detained outside
Ukraine’s State Border checkpoints, accord1
ing to estimates made by the State Committee
on Security of the State Border of Ukraine,
large amounts of smuggled cigarettes are ille1
gally imported to Ukraine via checkpoints
under faked documents for other goods.
The results of cigarette arrests by the State
Customs Agency of Ukraine corroborate this
fact; that is, Frontier Guards seized . mil1
lion packets of cigarettes outside the check1
points, while over . million packets of cig1
arettes were seized by the State Customs
Agency of Ukraine, largely at checkpoints.
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What facilitates smuggling activities?
Chart . Arrest of cigarettes on different frontier areas (thous packets)
The root of the smuggling problem along the western
border of Ukraine
Source: State Committee on Frontier Security of Ukraine  
Ukraine and checking whether the cargo
exported from Ukraine is that same one
which was imported.
• Possibilities to evade criminal responsi1
bility for involving in smuggling activi1
ties (lawbreakers are called to adminis1
trative account, not criminal).
• Restitution of smuggled goods under
arrest and hijacked vehicles to lawbreak1
ers.
• Dispersion of efforts by departments,
domination of departmental interests
over state ones—counteracting smuggling
activities is only done in the interests of
departments (who will be the first to
report about arrests to state authorities).
• Complete disappearance of goods and
cargoes from licensed warehouses.
• Checkpoints not properly fitted for 
auto and, particularly, railway crossings,
on the Ukrainian1Russian1Moldovan1
Belarusian border (lack of sites for scru1
tinising, unloading devices, specialised
equipment, electronic scales).
• Smuggled goods under arrest are not
assessed by competent authorities for a
lengthy period.
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• Submitting false cargo statements, that
is, another cargo is indicated, quantity
specified is less, the value is reduced.
• “Disrupted transit”, when goods are
imported to the territory of Ukraine for
transit absolutely legally, but after they
pass control the documents are
destroyed, goods are either transhipped
to other transport vehicles or number
plates of the vehicles are replaced, that is
how the goods are retained in Ukraine
and customs duties are not paid.
• Quite a large number of smuggled goods
get to the territory of Ukraine under
faked documents, or via ephemeral
firms, which are then either re1registered
or disappear altogether.
• Transportation of goods across the State
Border in small lots or by single items
by the local population, by passing
checkpoints, or through local check1
points many times per day respecting
the daily norms stipulated by legisla1
tion.
• Driving hijacked vehicles across the
State Border by means of substituting
documents, or importing vehicles which
are already registered in Ukraine.
Ways of conducting smuggling activities
. Develop and implement tight controlling
mechanisms over foreign trade activities
of legal entities and individuals, by scruti1
nising all import1export transactions.
. Finalize proposals to introduce necessary
amendments to the extant legislation of
Ukraine on granting the right to Frontier
Guards of Ukraine to interrogate in cases
of illegal cross1border movement of
goods, weaponry, and narcotics.
. Security ministries and departments of
the state should work out common guide1
lines on unified accounting and statistical
reporting of instances of arresting smug1
gled goods and violation of customs pro1
cedures.
. Implement for a certain period a state
monopoly on selling goods abroad that
may be expected to replenish the State
Treasury within maximally short terms.
. Synchronize the controlling functions of
banking, customs, tax, and border struc1
tures, as well as other controlling and law1
enforcement agencies within the control
system for export1import transactions.
. Practice conducting coordinated, short1
run, emergency, targeted, local operations
on the Ukrainian1Moldovan, Ukrainian1
Belarusian, Ukrainian1Russian stretches
of the border, both at checkpoints and
outside of them jointly with the Security
Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State
Tax Administration, State Customs
Agency, and State Border Committee of
Ukraine.
. Introduce a state system of incentives for
workers of law1enforcement and state con1
trolling agencies to arrest smuggled
goods, and procedures for the further
utilisation of seized goods for the material
and technical benefit of divisions of the
corresponding departments, and expan1
sion of the State Border and checkpoints.
. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
should allocate extra funds for properly
equipping of checkpoints across the State
Border, on the most intensive cargo traffic
routes.
. Determine efficient controlling mecha1
nisms over transit movement across the
territory of Ukraine of vehicles and car1
goes; set itineraries and routes for vehicles
carrying transit cargoes across the territo1
ry of Ukraine; and establish procedures
for tracking movement over the territory
of Ukraine.
. Clarify and amend the list of state1border
checkpoints, including air communica1
tions, which serve cross1border military
and special cargoes and excisable goods
cargoes being imported, exported, or
transited.
. Establish an inter1departmental database
on lawbreakers, listing individual identity
information, vehicles, cargo carriers, con1
signers, consignees, mediating structures
and firms detained for involvement in
smuggling activities.
In summary, the potential achievements and
benefits of European integration will exceed
the probable damages and risks, and eco1
nomic and trade relations with the European
Union offer a chance which should not be
missed, but it should be drawn on intelligent1
ly by both parties, distinguishing available
opportunities and justified caution from
unwise optimism and populist phobias.
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Steps to be undertaken in Ukraine
at the state level
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What will take place after 
EU expansion and the Schengen
Agreement coming into effect:
Policy prospects for Ukraine
Olena MALYNOVSKA
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EU expansion brings with it hope for posi1
tive changes in conjunction with our coun1
try approaching the European zone of sta1
bility and security. The movement of the EU
eastward will objectively increase its impact
on Ukraine in the area of introducing
European standards of democracy, business,
trade, human rights, etc.
Expansion of the EU, which will mean mod1
ernisation of co1operation with new union
members, objectively opens new, wider pos1
sibilities for co1operation between Ukraine
and the EU, making more real Ukraine’s
involvement in the implementation of joint
European projects for the development of
transport infrastructure.
In the economic sphere, the EU is already a
significant market for the sale of Ukrainian
goods, and a source of imports. Increasing
the population of the EU to nearly half a bil1
lion, high purchasing power of consumers,
and the dynamic development of economies
of member countries will increase the role
of the EU as a trade partner of Ukraine.
Expansion to include countries of Eastern
Europe with which Ukraine has developed
trade and economic ties will create new
prospects for increasing trade volumes.
The EU adopting countries which receive
large portions of the Ukrainian labour force
will promote the exchange of experience
between Ukrainian and European workers,
familiarising Ukrainian workers with lead1
ing forms of organising production, and
acquiring new knowledge and skills, which
will have a positive effect on increasing
labour productivity in Ukraine.
Consequences of EU expansion 
for Ukraine
The fifth expansion of the EU—unprecedented both in terms of the number of new
members and the depth of reforms—creates a principally new situation for
Ukraine. As a result of western neighbours joining the European Union, the
external border of the EU will go along the borders of our country. Its length
(along Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland) will be , km. Being direct
neighbours with the European Union—whose importance in the global employ/
ment market, system of international trade, and political sphere will undoubted/
ly increase after expanding to include Central European countries—will impact
both relations between Ukraine and the EU as well as other countries and the
domestic political and socio/economic development of Ukraine.
This impact will, of course, be varied, since the process of expansion itself is quite
contradictory. In the context of transforming western Ukrainian borders to exter/
nal EU borders, a conflict of interests emerges with regard to ensuring the inter/
nal security of the union and its fundamental foreign policy principle of openness;
in other words, between the declared transparency of borders, promoting region/
al trans/border co/operation and realistic limitations on movement across them
Possible advantages of EU expansion eastward
In the political sphere, membership in the
union of Eastern European countries with
whom Ukraine has strong friendly ties will
create conditions for the development of
new deeper forms of co1operation with the
EU, through its new members. In addition,
the accession to the EU of Ukraine’s tradi1
tional partners, which will have appropriate
representation in the management of the
union, will open possibilities for more suc1
cessful advancement of Ukraine’s interests
on the territory of the community, in co1
operation with neighbouring countries.
This also applies to the sphere of the proce1
dure for movement of citizens, and visa pol1
icy. Since western neighbours of Ukraine
will also carry significant material and other
losses if movement through the common
border is restricted, we can hope that they
will actively participate as EU members in
the search for mutually acceptable solutions
for Ukraine and the EU.
With EU expansion, the importance of
Ukraine as a direct neighbour will grow in
terms of European security. This opens the
way for the country for wider participation in
relevant international structures, and joint
actions together with the European Union.
Studying and practically applying the expe1
rience of neighbouring countries which
have managed to achieve concrete results in
their European integration efforts could be
an important accomplishment for Ukraine.
Additional prospects are emerging for
Ukraine in the area of regional and trans1
border co1operation with new EU members;
to this end, viable mechanisms have already
been created—including “euroregions”
(Carpathian, Upper Prut, and Buh [Bug]).
Since the EU is interested in ensuring peace
and stability on its borders, there is reason to
hope for the expansion of concrete assistance
which it provides for reforms in Ukraine.
Adopting the “Common Strategy of the
European Union to Ukraine” at the Helsinki
Summit in December , the Council of
Europe noted that the EU “acknowledges the
European aspirations of Ukraine and wel1
comes its European choice”. The Common
Strategy notes that “after the expansion
process currently happening is completed,
some of the future EU member countries will
have a common border with Ukraine.
Expansion of the union will increase even
more the economic dynamism and political
stability in the region, thus increasing the
possibilities for co1operation with Ukraine”.
The document lists the main goals of the EU
with regard to Ukraine. Among them are
support for the process of democratic and
economic reforms; ensuring stability and
security and resolving common problems on
the European continent; and support for
strengthening co1operation between the EU
and Ukraine in the context of EU expansion.
In the context of EU expansion, it is pro1
posed to increase co1operation with
Ukraine, devoting particular attention to co1
operation in the area of justice and internal
affairs. This will be based on mutual interest
in combating illegal immigration and peo1
ple trafficking, developing co1operation in
the area of border security and combating
organised crime.
With regard to the expansion process, the
Common Strategy also declares the effort of
the EU to strengthen dialogue with Ukraine
on the issue of agreeing a visa policy, by
defining visa requirements corresponding
to EU norms, and introducing travel docu1
ments that would be rather hard to falsify.
Of course, the abovementioned co1opera1
tion priorities, particularly in the migration
area, primarily reflect EU interests, since
they are focused on restricting immigration
to the EU. However, they equally take into
consideration Ukraine’s interests concern1
ing problem1free movement of citizens
across borders, labour migration, and
employment on the territory of European
Union member countries.
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At the same time, the readiness of the
European Union to co1operate on the given
objectives can be actively taken advantage of
by the Ukrainian side for activating its co1
operation and achieving understanding on
a wider range of issues.
Regardless of the constant declarations of
the EU, member countries, as well as
Ukraine on their interest in developing co1
operation and co1operation results, the
prospects of Ukraine joining the club of
European countries are really mixed.
Public opinion, testified in sociological sur1
veys, is rather pessimistic on the desire of a
united Europe to co1operate with our coun1
try. According to most of the population
(.% of respondents to a survey at the
end of ), European countries are
either indifferent or sceptical towards
Ukraine, and do not accept it as an equal
partner.
Problems and complications threatening
the future accession to the EU of Central
European countries are mostly connected to
the EU ignoring Ukraine’s interests and
wishing to wall off this poor and insuffi1
ciently stable country with a new “iron cur1
tain”.
In the foreign policy sphere, the accession
of neighbouring countries to the EU and
the relating dynamisation of their develop1
ment will increase even more the difference
in transformation rates between these coun1
tries and Ukraine, which will objectively
complicate bilateral relations. This can also
be exacerbated by subjective factors, that is,
Europe1focused political forces in these
countries; in the case of accession, their
positions will strengthen, and they will con1
sider co1operation with Ukraine, along with
wider regional co1operation in the East, to
be second1rate in comparison with the west1
ern vector of their foreign policy.
In the trade1economic sphere, competitive
positions of Ukrainian goods will worsen in
the markets of neighbouring countries, in
conjunction with the prospect of them
imposing the EU single tariff, as well as the
loss of possibilities of independently regu1
lating their trade regimes with Ukraine,
cancellation of free1trade agreements with
Ukraine and the Baltic countries, expansion
of anti1dumping measures against Ukraine,
etc. It is forecast that the reduction of
Ukrainian exports to countries of this
region can reach –%.
Ukraine’s geographic position gives rise to
hope for active participation in transit ship1
ments. At the same time, changes to condi1
tions for technical specifications of trans1
port vehicles in conjunction with neigh1
bouring countries joining the EU can lead
to the squeezing out of some Ukrainian
haulers from the transport services market.
Negative consequences in this context will
also be felt from changes to procedures for
customs and border control.
While the most optimistic scenario says that
EU expansion will create new trade condi1
tions for all countries and promote the
development of Ukraine’s participation in
European trade, transporting goods, and
regional co1operation, the pessimistic sce1
nario sees Ukraine being excluded from the
most important Europe1wide processes,
transforming it into an agricultural/natural
resource periphery.
The nature of the effect of EU expansion on
Ukraine in practice, of course, will not com1
ply completely with either of the two alter1
natives. Most likely, as a result of intertwin1
ing both objective and subjective factors
(among which are the internal political and
socio1economic situation in Ukraine itself
and the policy of the EU and its new mem1
bers) in different time periods, after EU
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Possible losses from EU expansion
expansion the situation will move closer
towards one or the other scenario, but it will
remain multifaceted.
The greatest complications are likely in the
nearest future, in the initial period after
expansion of the EU and the Schengen zone.
For the population of Ukraine, the most
obvious and significant effect of expansion
of the EU and Schengen zone will be the
strengthening of border controls at
Ukrainian borders with new union mem1
bers, and the introduction of a visa regime
for trips to these countries. These measures
will affect a significant portion of the popu1
lation of the country (last year, in ,
Ukrainian border forces registered . mil1
lion instances of Ukrainian citizens leaving
the country at borders with Poland,
Slovakia, and Hungary, i.e., EU candidate
countries for the “first wave”; the numbers
crossing the border into Poland are exceed1
ed only by crossings into Russia) and
inevitably will have a significant effect on
the formation of political opinion and the
socio1economic situation of many people.
In conjunction with the introduction of a
visa regime, it is quite realistic to expect the
prospective reduction of the entire complex
of trans1border relations—both economic
and humanitarian—with candidate coun1
tries. After all, the number of crossings by
people, who comprise these relations, will
inevitably fall. Over % of respondents to a
sociological survey believe that the intro1
duction of visas will make impossible their
trips to EU membership candidate coun1
tries; over % more did not reply, and %
believed that the introduction of visas will
affect their plans (versus % not planning
at all to visit these countries). For some, tak1
ing into consideration the income levels of
the population, trips abroad will become
unaffordable due to the amounts required
to pay for visas; for others, the obstacle will
be inconvenience of obtaining the visa
itself—distance, waiting in lines, and time
(an average two to six weeks is required to
obtain a visa), problems with documents,
and again the money required for all of this.
In proof, we compare the volume of border
crossings between Ukraine and Slovakia
during the three months before and the
three months after the introduction in June
 of the visa regime. Thus, according to
Ukrainian border officers, after the intro1
duction of visas the number of Ukrainian
citizens visiting Slovakia as tourists dropped
by %, while private trips fell by % and
business trips fell by %; the number of cit1
izens of Slovakia visiting Ukraine also fell
considerably, by %, %, and %, by
type of trip, respectively. Overall, the annual
number of trips by Ukrainian citizens to
Slovakia, and of Slovaks to Ukraine, practi1
cally halved after the visas were introduced.
Based on these data, we may analogously
assume that as a result of the introduction of
visas in June  planned by Poland, the
reduction of flows across the Ukrainian1
Polish border will amount to even more
than the –% forecast by Polish special1
ists. Since the absolute number of crossings
on the Ukrainian1Polish border is ten times
more than the number of crossings on the
Slovak border, the actual reduction of move1
ment across the border will be significantly
larger. The halving of trips by Ukrainian cit1
izens abroad as a result of the Polish intro1
duction of visas will mean . million fewer
trips a year; Hungary’s introduction of visas
will reduce trips by ,.
If we take the data of sociological surveys,
about % of Ukrainian citizens were abroad
at least once. Among them, those travelling
most often had the aim of visiting relatives—
nearly %—while over % travelled on
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Consequences of EU expansion 
in the sphere of migration and population movement
vacation or for tourist purposes, just over
% were on business trips, another % on
contract work, and the rest on exchanges,
studying, etc.
In crossing the border, the nature of the
trip, not the goal, is the matter; therefore,
the data of border officials have different
structure. Thus, during , among the cit1
izens of Ukraine going to Poland, Slovakia,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic % were
on official matters, % were members of
organised tourist groups, and the most com1
mon were private trips, comprising %.
Among the private trips must have been
trips aiming to look for jobs, and also trips
aiming to engage in petty trade, which are
usually recorded as trips on private matters.
A certain part of such trips was registered as
tourist trips, the so1called shopping tours.
For understandable reasons, the residents
of border regions travel most often. Here,
% of the population has passports, while
the country average for adults is about %.
According to border officials, most resi1
dents of populated areas on the border cross
the border at least once a month; some as
often as once a week.
According to the division of trips by their
goal, the areas where the effects of restrict1
ing border crossings will be felt most strong1
ly can be determined.
First of all, these are humanitarian contacts,
and family ties. Again, this problem is most
acute and painful in border regions. Some
estimates show every sixth family in the bor1
der zone of  km having relatives on the
other side.
The restriction of freedom of movement is a
particularly sensitive issue for citizens of
Ukraine belonging to minority nationalities
of the titular nations of neighbouring coun1
tries that live in border regions. Besides the
negative consequences common to all resi1
dents of border regions, it will also mean
new obstacles to maintaining ties with their
kin abroad, and in taking trips with cultural
or educational motives that are important
for preserving the ethnic viability of minori1
ties.
Procrastination by Poland and Hungary in
introducing visas can be explained to a large
extent by this very desire not to restrict inter1
action with representatives of Polish and
Hungarian national minorities in Ukraine.
Ukrainian citizens of Polish and Hungarian
ethnic background, albeit concerned about
the prospect of limitations on their border
crossings, are generally convinced that their
maternal nations will do everything possible
to preserve free association with their
national minorities. Thus, the expectations
of the Hungarian national minorities con1
nected with the Law of Hungary “On
Hungarians abroad”, which provides certain
advantages in entering Hungary for
Hungarians living abroad. However, there
are certain doubts as to whether the privi1
leges regarding ethnic Hungarians corre1
spond to the acquis communautaire. If they
do not, then Hungary will be forced to
amend its national legislation, which would
not be welcome news at all for Ukrainians of
Hungarian extraction.
The restrictions to cultural and humanitari1
an contacts will be felt not only by represen1
tatives of national minorities, but also by
wider cross1sections of the population.
Threatened will be the basic interests of citi1
zens travelling abroad for various purposes,
entailing maximum free movement, and the
absence or reduction of obstacles hindering
their trip. Considering the completely dis1
couraging ratio of incomes of Ukrainian cit1
izens and the cost of visas for representatives
of the intelligentsia (teachers, doctors, etc.),
tourist, recreational, or cultural trips by
ordinary citizens will be impossible.
The introduction of visas and increased bor1
der control will also negatively affect the
level of business contacts, since the cost of
trips for negotiations or signing relevant
contracts will increase.
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The problem of introducing a visa regime
will touch on the interests of hundreds of
thousands of Ukrainian citizens, who in the
complex conditions of the transition period
selected the strategy of ensuring the welfare
of their families by migrating to work
abroad. According to some assessments, 
up to  million Ukrainian citizens leave 
the country each year to work abroad for 
 month to  year. Employment abroad
today has important social significance; it is
creating positive pressure on the job market
and reducing social tension within the coun1
try. Along with labour migration eastward,
that is, to Russia, temporary employment in
EU and EU candidate countries is becoming
increasingly more widespread. Nearly
, Ukrainian citizens work in Portugal;
, in Spain; up to , in Italy, up to
, in Poland and the Czech Republic,
about , in Slovakia, and nearly ,
in Hungary. Some assessments put the aver1
age monthly incomes of citizens working
abroad at over  billion hryvnias, which is
equal to one1third of the nominal cash
incomes of the entire population.
Some time ago, Ukraine signed an agree1
ment about employment of its citizens with
Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.
In conjunction with the future accession of
these countries to the EU, it will become
more difficult to fulfil these agreements.
Even more significant consequences will be
felt from the increased control of candidate
countries over the employment of
Ukrainians beyond the scope of these agree1
ments. After all, illegal labour migration is
much greater in scope than that taking place
under the framework of inter1state agree1
ments. Thus, for example, while in  just
over , Ukrainians were officially
employed in the Czech Republic, the num1
ber of illegal employees exceeded this figure
by almost  times. Combating illegal
employment will lead to the return of many
Ukrainian workers, who support hundreds
of thousands of families, which will have a
serious negative effect. Particularly threat1
ening consequences may be had for certain,
mainly border, regions that supply most of
the migrants and are characterised by a high
level of unemployment (according to the
data of the Transcarpathia Oblast State
Administration, , of their residents
work abroad).
The restriction of illegal employment by
control means is incapable of halting it,
since the demand for cheap Ukrainian
labour in neighbouring countries will con1
tinue to exist. Moreover, in certain sectors
and regions, it can be expected to increase
as a result of local workers leaving to work in
the West, given these possibilities will
expand in the process of joining the EU.
Along with the demand for workers from
Ukraine, one of the effects of future expan1
sion may also be the increased supply of
Ukrainian labour force in the employment
markets of neighbouring countries. The
thing is that the difference in levels of pros1
perity, evident even today between people
living on opposite sides of the border, will
only increase with the joining of neighbour1
ing countries to the EU and the raising of
their lifestyle to that of the European aver1
age. The possibility of bigger incomes,
whose attractiveness will be even greater the
more they exceed not only the European
average but also the minimum subsistence
level in Ukraine, will be a strong factor to
draw migrant workers.
Thus, problems connected with illegal
labour migration, such as feeding the shad1
ow economy and corruption in candidate
countries and absence of guarantees of
labour or human rights of Ukrainian work1
ers, will continue to exist.
The introduction of visas will lead to
increased expenses for commercial business
trips, and therefore also to reduction of the
volume of business tourism. This will have a
negative effect on the welfare of part of the
population, especially in border oblasts.
Thus, according to the State Committee for
Tourism, in  the proportion of residents
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of Transcarpathia, Lviv, and Chernivtsi
oblasts in tourism abroad was .%, which
is wholly out of proportion to the population
of these regions compared to the total
Ukrainian population. Understandably,
these are commercial tourists, who under
conditions of high unemployment and low
wages are creating incomes by bringing small
parties of goods across the border. The visas
will be most painful for the least1protected
categories of citizens—unemployed, pension1
ers, and schoolchildren, who sometimes actu1
ally make their living by selling the  ciga1
rettes and litre of alcohol which are permitted
for export, and by bringing knick1knacks back
for sale.
In this context, it is understandable why
every fifth respondent to a representative
sociological survey of Ukraine said that the
introduction of visas will have a negative
effect on his welfare and that of his family.
Restricting crossings into neighbouring west1
ern countries will result in the intensification
of trips of Ukrainian citizens eastward. This
will apply to both tourist and recreational
trips, as well as trips aiming for employment
and petty trade, which is particularly impor1
tant. It is worth noting that this trend is evi1
dent already, due to a large degree to the
introduction of visa regimes by the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Namely,
against the background of reduced total trips
to these countries, the border statistics testify
to the increase of number of trips to coun1
tries neighbouring Ukraine to the east. For
example, while in  there were . million
border crossings towards Russia by Ukrainian
citizens, in  there were . million, and
. million in .
Yet another consequence of making the
western border more difficult to cross, in
our opinion, may be the prospect of
increased tendency of the Ukrainian popu1
lation to leave permanently and reside
abroad. After our country acquired inde1
pendence, emigration gradually fell, among
other things because its main goal of
increasing welfare could be accomplished
by means of temporary trips without chang1
ing place of residence or cutting important
individual social ties. The disappearance of
such a possibility will stimulate emigration,
first of all of representatives of national
minorities, which have more chances of
receiving permission to enter foreign coun1
tries, often have relatives abroad, and pain1
lessly handle problems of language and cul1
tural adaptation in their new environment.
The result of establishing strict control on the
borders with western neighbours that seri1
ously concerns the public (the problem of
border security was singled out by % of
respondents to a sociological survey conduct1
ed in summer ); and there is a threat of
illegal migrants collecting in the country on
their way to trying to get to the West. Along
with that are the threats of importing crime,
terrorism, uncommon infectious diseases,
additional burdens on the Ukrainian labour
market, expansion of the shadow economy,
which uses illegal workers, and emergence in
the population of a negative attitude to the
arrivals and moods of intolerance. All this
can have a negative influence on the internal
situation in the country.
Thanks to the efforts of border and law1
enforcement agencies, and joint measures
with border forces of neighbouring countries,
the intensity of illegal migration across
Ukrainian borders has been significantly
decreased. Thus, while in  over ,
illegal migrants were detained in attempting
to illegally cross the border, in  it was
,, and , in . At the same time,
the problem of illegal migration remains
urgent primarily due to the existence in the
country of foreigners with undefined status,
who arrived here in the previous period, and
also the essential lack of a deportation system.
In conjunction with the problem of illegal
migration, in our opinion it would be worth
noting that a fortified border will not guar1
antee the dissemination of organised crime
or illegal entries on the territory of the EU.
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Speaking of the possible domestic policy
results of expansion of the EU and the
Schengen zone to Ukraine’s borders, it must
be kept in mind what significance during
the past ten years the possibility had to go
abroad, not only for the socio1economic sit1
uation for residents of Ukraine, but also for
the transformation of their mentality from
Homo Sovieticus to citizens of an independent
European country—a transformation which,
by the way, has not yet been finalised for a
great number of Ukrainians.
Recall that the Iron Curtain which separat1
ed Ukraine and other USSR republics from
the external world was an essential element
of the Soviet system, one of its cornerstones.
The liberalisation of movement, which
began in the perestroika years, charac1
terised the crumbling of totalitarianism, on
the one hand, and accelerated it, on the
other. Already in the first years after inde1
pendence, Ukraine totally liquidated state
control over citizens’ trips abroad. As of 
 January , the procedure was cancelled
whereby for any trip abroad people had to
receive permission from the relevant gov1
ernment authorities. The Law of Ukraine
“On the procedure for leaving Ukraine and
entering Ukraine by citizens of Ukraine”
adopted in February  ensured every cit1
izen the unrestricted right to receive docu1
ments for crossing the state border (the
restrictions stipulated in the law on obtain1
ing passports, such as failure to fulfil finan1
cial or other obligations, or having to do
with state secrets, had only a temporary, not
an absolute, effect).
On the other hand, thanks to the policy of
governments of Central and South1eastern
Europe, above all Poland, which were aimed
at establishing close neighbourly relations
with independent Ukraine, Ukrainian citi1
zens obtained the possibility without any
particular problems to travel in the territory
of these countries. Trips abroad, which dur1
ing Soviet times were the privilege of a few,
became affordable for ordinary citizens.
Passenger flows across the western border
quadrupled. In the last five years alone, the
number of trips by Ukrainian citizens to
Poland increased by more than %. The
“window to Europe” came to be one of the
Convincing evidence of this are at least half
a million illegal migrants arriving each year
to Western Europe, despite all measures to
fortify the outside walls of “fortress Europe”.
It’s absolutely obvious that super1strict bor1
der controls will affect not criminals above
all, but ordinary citizens.
And not only in Ukraine but also in candi1
date countries for accession to the EU.
Thus, the comparatively poorest regions of
Poland, directly bordering Ukraine, annual1
ly receive several billion USD thanks to
arrivals from Ukraine. Ukrainians are con1
sumers of various goods and services of
Polish manufacture. They fulfil seasonal
temporary work in Poland, under condi1
tions which would not satisfy Poles. The wel1
fare of many citizens of Poland depends on
trips of Ukrainians; they will be in dire
straits if the border is closed.
The negative effects of restricting move1
ment across the border will also affect the
situation in the EU, since the emergence of
a zone of instability on its very borders, as
well as the restriction of the traditionally
mutually convenient co1operation between
Ukraine and candidate countries, cannot be
in the interests of the European Union.
Particularly sharp may be the effects of
introducing visas and super1strict border
controls in the short term, if such measures
are carried out without consideration of
their effects for Ukraine.
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Effects of expansion on domestic and foreign policy
processes
most obvious achievements of independ1
ence and the democratisation of societal
life.
Free movement between neighbouring
countries also had a positive effect on the
development of bilateral inter1state rela1
tions. Thousands of people on both sides of
the border could become better acquainted.
Border relations became not only demon1
strative but substantive. Contacts between
national minorities and their maternal
nations were significantly simplified
(Transcarpathian Hungarians, Galician and
Volhynian Poles, Polish and Slovakian
Ukrainians, etc.), and co1operation deep1
ened between countries, and local authori1
ties in border regions, in resolving their spe1
cific problems. All this was extremely impor1
tant for overcoming the historical burden of
mutual prejudices, stereotypes, and nega1
tive memories, clearly confirmed by the
gradual progress in Ukrainian1Polish rela1
tions, which permitted the presidents of the
two countries to sign in  a historical
joint statement, “Towards an Understanding
and Rapprochement”.
With the introduction of visas and the
future joining of neighbouring countries to
the Schengen agreement, one of the great1
est achievements of the nineties—free move1
ment across borders—will be left in the past.
In practice, this entails restrictions for
Ukrainians of one of their fundamental
human rights—the right to free movement
and the selection of place of residence.
Thus, for example, according to a sociologi1
cal survey (February ), over % of
respondents see a restriction of their civil
and human rights in the introduction by
Poland of a visa regime for Ukrainians.
This may become a watershed moment in
the formation of political views of many peo1
ple, particularly those who will suffer con1
crete losses. After all, one of the strongest
arguments for independence and the entire
complex of social reforms is lost. Restricting
movement across borders for many will
mean a defeat of democracy, return to old
times, and will lead to disillusion in
European values, or hopes of finding one’s
place in the civilised world.
One of the results of such a course of events
may be the identification of the process of
EU expansion with the threat of marginali1
sation or isolation, and an increasing inferi1
ority complex, connected with the fact that
Europe is distancing itself from Ukraine.
Even more serious is the disillusionment in
our European choice—which, as experience
shows, will not help ordinary folk at all in
resolving their vital problems. This may
strengthen feelings of isolationism, and
also1more important—push public opinion
in the direction of a union of Eastern Slavic
nations, if not the USSR.
As is known, the foreign policy sympathies
of the Ukrainian population, according to
sociological surveys, are generally equally
divided between an eastern and a western
orientation, with a slight advantage for the
east. Although, as sociologists testify, there is
a significant potential for sympathy for the
EU, its realisation will depend directly on
specific measures by the European Union
for Ukraine’s benefit, and on results of co1
operation. If the population is convinced in
the hopelessness of its expectations to join
Europe, among the first reactions could be
forecast the strengthening of foreign policy
choices of both the political elite and ordi1
nary citizens in the direction of Russia and
other CIS countries.
This will mean the weakening of positions of
Europe1oriented Ukrainian politicians
(which is practically synonymous with liber1
al1democratically oriented politicians), cor1
responding changes to the hierarchy of
political powers, and, as a result, worsening
prospects for market and democratic trans1
formations in Ukraine.
Against this background, it is not unlikely
that differences between western and east1
ern regions of Ukraine would increase. The
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west, which considers itself to be in Europe
both historically and mentally, can oppose
the east, blaming the easterners for Europe
not wanting to have anything to do with
Ukraine. This carries with it the threat of
pro1Western separatism, and the emergence
in certain regions of calls to integrate with
Europe without Greater Ukraine; this would
create a new dividing line between Europe
and non1Europe, which would cross the
heart of Ukraine. The development of simi1
lar attitudes is most likely in Transcarpathia,
which is the Ukrainian region most con1
nected geographically, economically, and
ethnically to neighbouring countries which
will be EU members, as well as Galicia, to a
certain extent.
In order to prevent this, it would be neces1
sary to convince the public in the EU’s inter1
est in Ukrainian integration, and a willing1
ness to consider its interests. In the context
of expanding the Schengen zone up to the
borders of Ukraine, these interests entail
seeking ways of minimising the negative
effects of Ukraine’s western neighbours
introducing a visa regime. To improve rela1
tions, it would be worthwhile for the
European Union to put maximum effort so
that the building of a new “iron curtain” on
its eastern frontier—which, after the end of
the cold war, could be nothing except an
anachronism—does not happen. By the way,
it should be noted that among other things,
such a wall would cause increased contradic1
tions between the EU and its new members
who have important vital interests in the
East.
Both Ukraine and the EU should find mech1
anisms to compensate possible losses in co1
operation. There is still time for this, since
the process of allowing new members into
the EU is still ongoing, but relevant meas1
ures must be adopted immediately.
As paradoxical as it may be, the expected
negative results of expansion for Ukraine, in
our opinion, have a positive effect on the
dynamisation of this process. The closer and
more realistic the threat of being left on the
sidelines of European development, the
more seriously the political elite in the coun1
try starts to make declarations on European
choice, and strives to substantiate this slogan
with concrete content. In particular, this is
shown in both the recent official statements
by the highest officials in the country and in
the foreign policy strategies of political par1
ties and blocs campaigning for the parlia1
mentary elections (slated for March ).
On the other hand, the position of EU coun1
tries will also undergo changes to the benefit
of considering Ukraine’s interests.
The only possible and the most effective way
of preventing negative effects of EU expan1
sion for Ukraine is the intensification of
practical measures to develop and deepen
co1operation with the EU in various spheres
and at various levels, and accelerating inter1
nal reforms, with the aim of achieving align1
ment with European standards.
Ukraine’s declared course towards European
integration was transferred to the practical
dimension thanks to the Partnership and Co1
operation Agreement, which became effec1
tive as of  March , between the
European Community and member coun1
tries and Ukraine (hereinafter—PCA) after it
was ratified by EU countries.
According to the PCA, joint bodies were cre1
ated—a council and a committee on co1oper1
ation between Ukraine and the EU. The lat1
ter is comprised of four multi1profile com1
mittees. Most migration problems belong to
the competency of the subcommittee on cus1
toms, trans1border co1operation, combating
illegal migration, organised crime, money1
laundering, and narcotics trafficking.
Ukraine’s obligations under this agreement
in the migration sphere include a general1
nature obligation regarding compliance
with democratic principles and taking meas1
ures for the gradual alignment of existing
and future Ukrainian legislation to that of
the EU (Article ).
Article  of the PCA is devoted to the obli1
gations of parties directly involved in migra1
tion issues; also, the EC and its member
countries shall strive to ensure that the sta1
tus of Ukrainian citizens working legally on
the territory of member countries did not
permit any discrimination on the basis of
citizenship with regard to working condi1
tions, compensation, or layoffs compared to
their own citizens. Similar obligations with
regard to EU country citizens are taken on
by the Ukrainian side.
In addition, in Article  the sides are
obliged to adopt provisions mutually that
are necessary to co1ordinate the system of
social security of employees who have
Ukrainian citizenship and work legally on
the territory of member countries. These
provisions should ensure contributions for
all periods of social insurance in determin1
ing pensions, medical services, and also the
transfer of pensions from one country to
another.
The PCA also foresees the possibility of
employment in EU countries of categories
of persons such as management of
Ukrainian companies operating on the ter1
ritory of said countries, their affiliates or
subsidiaries. According to Article , a
Ukrainian company founded on the territo1
ry of the EC has the right to hire or charge
one of its subsidiaries or affiliates with hir1
ing workers and officers who are citizens of
Ukraine, on condition that said workers and
officers are key personnel and that they are
hired exclusively by said companies, sub1
sidiaries, or affiliates. Permissions for resi1
dency and employment are issued to such
workers and officers only for their employ1
ment period.
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Possibilities for minimising
negative effects of expansion
Seeking mutually acceptable solutions 
at the multilateral and bilateral
Along with that, it is emphasised (Article )
that the provisions in the Agreement do not
provide citizens of Ukraine the right to
enter or stay on the territory of the EU in
any status, even the status of company share1
holder or partner, or its manager or employ1
ees, supplier, or service client. Affiliates of
Ukrainian companies cannot either hire or
use the work of citizens of Ukraine on the
territory of the community, or provide
Ukrainian citizens for working for other
persons and under their control on tempo1
rary employment contracts.
Nevertheless, it can be said that certain
interests of Ukrainian citizens working on
the territory of EU countries were reflected
in the PCA. Along with that, the Agreement
signed with Ukraine is missing some provi1
sions on migration that are found in agree1
ments between the EU and Central
European countries. Particularly, on the fact
that marriages and children of persons who
are working in EU countries legally have the
right for work during the term of the resi1
dency permit for heads of their families. Or
the norm in the EU Agreement with Poland
(absent in agreements with other countries)
that anticipates the possibility of providing
permission for employment to citizens who
already have permission to reside in EU
countries, except those who have arrived to
visit or as tourists. This norm could above all
be applied to students. Moreover, according
to agreements with countries of Central
Europe, citizens of these countries have the
right to self1employment on EU territory.
This category of workers include, for exam1
ple, petty traders, or persons with free pro1
fessions engaged in creative activity abroad.
In earlier agreements with candidate coun1
tries, signed with Greece, Portugal, and
Spain, guaranteed rights were stipulated for
residency and employment for citizens of
these countries who at the time of signature
of the agreements already resided and
worked in Western Europe.
Since the PCA has provisions according to
which the text of the agreement can undergo
revisions during three years after it has come
into effect, the time has come to put the ques1
tion of protecting the rights of Ukrainian
migrant workers working on the territory of
EU countries, at least in such forms as already
existed or exist in EU agreements with other
countries which are not (or were not at the
time the agreements were signed) members
of the union. It would be worthwhile to put
forth propositions for discussion on granting
permission for employment of members of
families of citizens who are legally employed
abroad, and also those who already have resi1
dency permits, with regard to enabling inde1
pendent economic activity of Ukrainian
workers on EU territory, etc. 
An encouraging form of resolving migration
issues between Ukraine and EU countries is
the signing of employment agreements.
Today, Ukraine has signed a series of bilater1
al agreements with neighbouring coun1
tries—Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak
Republic; the fulfilment of said agreements
after the given countries join the EU, and
the further expansion of their activity, does
not contradict the union’s legislation. This
conclusion is based, among other things, on
the provisions of agreements between the
EU and candidate countries, reflecting the
union’s approach to the existence of bilater1
al agreements on employment between its
members and third countries. The agree1
ments note that the possibility of employing
workers from candidate countries, as pro1
vided in bilateral agreements on mutual
employment, signed with individual EU
members, remain and can be expanded. We
will also note that most of these agreements
were signed with Central European coun1
tries, mostly Germany, even before they rati1
fied the EU agreement.
These agreements regulate the employ1
ment of intern1workers who go abroad with
the aim of increasing their qualifications
and languages, seasonal workers, and also
workers employed in the implementation
of individual projects. Regardless of certain
restrictions—rather meagre quotas, small
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employment terms, the obligation of leav1
ing the country after the term is finished,
the prohibition on looking for other work in
the country of residence, and age brackets
which are very narrow in the case of intern
employees—bilateral agreements are an
important instrument for ensuring access by
workers from Central European countries to
the European job market (for example,
under proper agreements over ,
Poles work abroad every year). First of all,
they created quite large possibilities for
employment of citizens of countries of the
region in Western Europe on a legal basis,
which allowed to a certain extent to trans1
form the illegal migration into a legal sea1
sonal or temporary migration. Second,
undoubtedly they met the interests of
employers in the West, who obtained neces1
sary and undemanding workers, workers
having the possibility of earning money, and
also countries of origin of the migrants who
thanks to the export of their workforce
acquired a whole series of benefits, such as
reduced pressure on the internal labour
market, improvement of the socioeconomic
situation of families of migrants, hard1cur1
rency takings, increased level of qualifica1
tion of representatives of the labour force.
Unfortunately, to date Ukraine has not
achieved any agreement with any EU country
on seasonal employment of its citizens or
intern1employees, though suchlike initia1
tives by our country were put forward. At
present, it seems that there are more chances
for seeking possibilities to sign agreements
on temporary seasonal employment of
Ukrainian migrant workers on a multilateral
level, i.e., with the EU as a whole. The
achievement of such agreements will give
grounds to both the signing of concrete
bilateral agreements and to the expansion of
application and enhancement with new sub1
stance of agreements on employment that
have been signed with candidate countries.
The next block of questions that needs to be
resolved on the inter1state level applies to
visa policy. It is important to start with the
fact that the swiftest adaptation to the intro1
duction of a visa regime regarding
Ukrainian citizens by new EU members,
together with the weakening of the strict
procedure for arranging visas for
Ukrainians to EU countries is in the inter1
ests of both countries.
In Ukraine, a conceptual plan for migration
and visa policy has been developed; it stipu1
lates deliberate steps in the direction of lib1
eralising the visa regime with EU member
countries and candidate countries for join1
ing the EU, and the introduction of a
stricter procedure for allowing entry of citi1
zens of countries supplying illegal migrants.
Aiming to increase control over the issue and
ensuring proper protection of Ukrainian
entry visas, in February  Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine resolution No. 
introduced a new procedure for obtaining
visa documents for entering Ukraine, and a
Schengen1type visa sticker was introduced
with the proper counterfeit protection.
Increasing control over entering Ukraine
was manifested in the government decision
on crossing the border by CIS country citi1
zens only with a passport (except the
Russian Federation and Belarus, with
whom there are separate agreements 
on this matter), which came into effect on
 January .
At the same time, since  Ukraine has
unilaterally introduced a visa1free regime of
entry for citizens of EU member countries
who have diplomatic passports. Also, the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine resolution
dated  May  exempted citizens of EU
countries, Canada, the USA, Turkey,
Switzerland, and Japan travelling with an
official, business, scientific, or private aim,
and also for cultural or sports exchange,
from the necessity of presenting an invita1
tion in arranging for a Ukrainian entry visa.
The next step in the liberalisation of the visa
regime with the European Union is negotia1
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tions on simplifying the procedure for issu1
ing visas and reducing the consular fees.
Agreement has been reached with Austria
regarding free1of1charge arrangements of
visas for certain categories of citizens of
both countries. A draft similar agreement is
being prepared with Spain, the relevant
issue is being worked on with Britain, etc.
These steps show that Ukraine is willing to
take the path of gradual unilateral simplifi1
cation of procedures for granting visas to
citizens of EU member countries, even to
the point of cancelling them altogether. At
the same time, demonstrating goodwill on
the Ukrainian side is calculated to prompt
the other side to symmetrical actions. We
expect at least the willingness to discuss the
issue of simplifying the visa regime with
respect to citizens of Ukraine.
In the long term, initiatives are possible with
regard to changing certain provisions of the
Schengen agreement, which regulates the
EU visa procedure. Taking into considera1
tion the principled position of the
European Union regarding the impossibili1
ty of any exception to joint decisions, what is
meant is amending the Schengen agree1
ments itself, which have been criticised with1
in the EU as well, not about a special atti1
tude to Ukraine. This does not mean, how1
ever, that using diplomatic means Ukraine
should not raise the question of exempting
our country from the so1called blacklist of
countries whose citizens can enter EU terri1
tory only with a mandatory visa.
Well, that is an issue for the future. Today, it
looks more realistic to find means not of
obviating the Schengen requirements but of
adjusting to them with the least losses. The
opening of additional consulate agencies of
EU countries and candidate countries in
regions of Ukraine, which would allow citi1
zens to avoid the expensive and difficult trip
to Kyiv and reduced waitlines is one of the
possible measures. Of course, this would
require additional expenses on the part of
the partners of Ukraine (in fact, introducing
visas for trips by Ukrainian citizens will
require, in the opinion of Polish experts, hir1
ing at least – additional consular offi1
cers), but this could be a concrete affirma1
tion of their willingness not only to declare
but also to truly deepen co1operation.
The next step would be to reduce the cost
and align the tariffs for consular fees for
arranging visas, to make their arrangement
more affordable and comprehensible to
Ukrainian citizens. Today, visa costs are dif1
ferent even in the embassies of EU member
countries. As to candidate countries, the
cost of their visas (of those countries which
have already introduced visa procedures) is
sometimes even higher that that of member
countries. For example, a Bulgarian tourist
visa (along with obtaining the necessary
documents) costs  USD, while in most
embassies of EU member countries visas
cost the equivalent of – USD.
Adapting to the introduction of visas by
neighbouring countries and the expansion
of the Schengen zone could help to improve
the work of consular agencies of EU coun1
tries as a whole. Increasing the clarity and
responsiveness of the procedure for obtain1
ing documents would promote the reduc1
tion of demeaning to people lines, which
among other things are also a breeding
ground for various types of abuses and
bribe1taking, including on the part of
employees of foreign diplomatic representa1
tives.
Greater openness during the visa procedure
would promote the establishment of an
atmosphere of trust and co1operation.
Besides information about documents
required to be submitted for the visa,
Ukrainian citizens are worthy of knowing
the legal foundations for these require1
ments, and in case the visa is refused, to
know the reasons for such a decision. Today,
the practice of rejections without any expla1
nations in fact deprives Ukrainian citizens
of the possibility of appealing against the
decisions of consular authorities, or at least
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to be certain that the rejection was not due
to a misunderstanding or a direct error.
Since the expansion of the Schengen zone
does not imply the full discontinuation by
countries joining it of issuing national
visas, valid only for entering the territory of
the given country, along with its neigh1
bours Ukraine should seek additional pos1
sibilities to weaken the problem. This
could mean an agreement on arranging for
a certain number of free1of1charge multi1
entry visas which would be valid, for exam1
ple, for a year for citizens who have rela1
tives on that side of the border, or were
born on a territory which today is part of
another state, or who belong to national
minorities. In any case, a special regime for
crossing the border should be preserved
for residents of populated areas directly
near to the border.
A better1adjusted and fast passage proce1
dure could also mitigate the negative effect
of introducing a visa regime on the intensity
of movement across the border. In recent
years, much has already been done to equip
the border checkpoints. New terminals have
been built, many control points have creat1
ed a necessary service infrastructure. For
example, the auto1transport passage
through the Ukrainian1Polish border at
Krakovets–Korchov in Yavoriv raion, Lviv
oblast, is regarded as one of the best in
Europe. However, even now most check1
points are such as were built over  years
ago, where there are no necessary conven1
iences for citizens, nor proper working con1
ditions for border officers. That is why the
further development of the border infra1
structure is still important and can be a sig1
nificant area of co1operation between
Ukraine and neighbouring countries, and
with the EU as a whole. Simplification of
crossing the border will be promoted by
new, more progressive forms of organising
work—for example, joint border controls by
border officers of neighbouring countries.
Yet another important sphere where joint
efforts of Ukraine and foreign countries are
required, and possible fruitful both bilater1
al and multilateral co1operation aiming to
minimise the negative effects of EU expan1
sion in the migration sphere is the preven1
tion of illegal migration and accumulation
of illegal migrants on the territory of
Ukraine. This should entail not only the
strengthening of the future common bor1
der for Ukraine and the EU, but also equip1
ping the state border of Ukraine on its
entire perimeter. Ukraine requires consul1
tative, expert, and financial assistance, assis1
tance in training personnel, facilitation in
access to innovative technologies for pro1
tecting the border, modern technical
means, etc. Providing such assistance on
the part of the EU is in the interests of the
European Union and could be a significant
contribution in ensuring Europe1wide secu1
rity. At the same time, Ukraine must be
aware that business the effectiveness of this
assistance and, ultimately, its scope will
depend on its decisiveness and purposeful1
ness in finalising the legal establishment of
the eastern border, ensuring its reliable pro1
tection, and signing agreements on read1
mission with eastern neighbours, from
where Ukraine receives most illegal
migrants detained on its territory (over
% from the Russian Federation, up to
% from the Republic of Belarus).
A necessary condition for deepening co1
operation with the EU is the successful
reform of Ukraine itself, aligning its legisla1
tion and administrative practice to
European standards. Institutional align1
ment with the EU in the area of regulating
migration processes, purposeful movement
in introducing European norms and stan1
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Alignment of migration policy and migration
legislation of Ukraine with European standards
dards, will open the way to further close1
ness, including acquiring visa privileges.
The state policy of integrating Ukraine to
the European Union, which has been car1
ried out since , was performed at the
first stage exclusively in the area of foreign
policy activity, but later more and more
transformed into an element of domestic
policy.
With Decree No. / dated  June
, the President of Ukraine approved
the Strategy for the Integration of Ukraine
to the European Union, which determines
the main objectives for the work of execu1
tive government bodies for the period to
, during which conditions are to be
created necessary for Ukraine to acquire
full1fledged membership in the EU and join1
ing the European political, economic, and
legal space.
Among other things, the Strategy anticipat1
ed the preparation of a detailed Integration
Programme. This Programme, a rather
bulky and complicated structure document
comprising  chapters, was approved by
Decree No. / of the President of
Ukraine dated  September . The con1
crete action plans for the implementation of
priority provisions of the Programme that
have been developed since  are an
inalienable part of it. In its turn, an element
of the Action Plan is a work plan on adapt1
ing Ukrainian legislation to that of the EU.
The content of the Programme was deter1
mined taking into consideration the con1
tent of the PCA, EU documents on the com1
mon strategy regarding Ukraine, and also
the experience of preparing and imple1
menting similar programmes for candidate
countries for joining the European Union.
It encompasses various aspects of public
life, the economy, and culture, and antici1
pates purposeful steps for approaching the
criteria defined by the EU Council in June
 in Copenhagen as being necessary for
membership in this organisation.
Since in signing the Amsterdam Treaty (in
effect as of  May ) the EU countries,
among other things, agreed on a single pol1
icy for all of Europe in the field of immigra1
tion and refugees, which, of course is
mandatory also for candidate countries, the
Integration Programme includes special
chapters devoted to the issue of managing
migration.
Above all, the objective is stipulated of
ensuring human rights and freedoms in the
process of migrational movement in accor1
dance with the Constitution of Ukraine and
international obligations, particularly the
right to freedom of movement and selection
of place of residence.
Among the priorities set forth in the
Programme are the following: improving
Ukrainian legislation on citizenship in com1
pliance with the  European Convention
on Citizenship; initiating a state register of
physical persons, to replace the propyska
(residency permit system); creating condi1
tions for Ukraine to join the  UN
Convention and  Protocol on refugee
status; joining the European Social Charter
insofar as the part applying to migrant work1
ers, etc.
It is planned to continue work in the direc1
tion of simplifying the visa regime between
Ukraine and the EU, and also preserving a
maximally simplified regime of trips
between Ukraine and EU candidate coun1
tries. Along with that, increased attention
will be paid to strengthening border and
immigration control, and measures aimed
at preventing illegal migration.
In the time since the adoption of the
Programme, Ukraine has taken serious
steps in the direction of fulfilling it, with the
aim of achieving European criteria in the
field of legislation on migration and
refugees. First of all, a new redaction was
adopted of the Law of Ukraine “On citizen1
ship of Ukraine” (January ), which
resolved many issues connected with citizen1
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ship for such categories of persons as repa1
triates, especially those who were previously
deported, who have returned to Ukraine,
refugees, migrants on the basis of family
reunification, etc. With the adoption of the
law, compliance was achieved of national
legislation with the European Convention
on Citizenship.
In June , two extremely important laws
for the regulation of the migration sphere
were adopted at once—that is, a new redac1
tion of the Law of Ukraine “On refugees”,
which ensured compliance of national
Ukrainian legislation with the  UN
Convention on refugee status, as well as the
Law of Ukraine “On immigration”, which
regulates the procedure for foreigners and
persons without citizenship to enter or leave
on the territory of Ukraine for permanent
residence.
By its content, the Law of Ukraine “On
refugees” can be regarded as one of the most
liberal among similar European laws. In
adopting this law, Ukraine took upon itself
not only the obligations stipulated by the
 Convention, but also significantly
wider ones. For example, the principle of
non1deportation, the basic principle of the
entire international system of protecting
refugees, was substantially widened.
According to the Ukrainian law, deportation
of refugees is not only not permitted to the
country of origin, but also to a country from
which they could be sent somewhere where
they would be threatened with danger due
to their race, religion, nationality, citizen1
ship, or belonging to a certain social group.
In addition, refugees cannot be deported or
forcibly returned to a country where they
may be tortured or in other ways handled or
penalised that are violent, inhuman, or
demeaning.
The Law of Ukraine “On refugees” also sig1
nificantly expands the rights of refugees.
Equivalent rights to those of Ukrainian citi1
zens are established for them for: work, busi1
ness activity, healthcare and medical assis1
tance, recreation, education, possession,
usage, and disposal of their property and
results of their intellectual or creative activi1
ty, appealing to court decisions, actions, or
lack thereof of state authorities, local gov1
ernment bodies, and officials or civil ser1
vants. In the Convention, where relevant
rights are stipulated in articles  (property
rights),  (author’s rights),  (right to
appeal to court), – (right to work on
hire and to individual and business activity),
and  (education), refugees are mostly
compared not to citizens of the country in
which they are found, but to foreigners liv1
ing in this country. For example, in educa1
tion, according to the Convention, refugees
should be given rights equal to those of citi1
zens only with regard to primary education.
Therefore, the rights guaranteed to
refugees by the national legislation of
Ukraine are in part wider than those stipu1
lated in the Convention.
The law allows among the reasons for adopt1
ing a decision to refuse to grant refugee sta1
tus the location of the applicant in a so1
called “third safe country”, where they may
be protected as a refugee. However, this
restriction can be applied only if this coun1
try complies with certain criteria; in particu1
lar, it follows international standards of
human rights, recognised principles for pro1
tecting refugees, has the appropriate nation1
al legislation and administrative bodies, is
capable of ensuring the seeker of asylum
effective protection, agrees to accept the
person, and allow them to the procedure of
defining their status. The criteria defining a
third safe country that are found in the
Ukrainian law have been borrowed from rel1
evant recommendations of the Council of
Europe.
Convincing confirmation of Ukraine’s
efforts to create a system of asylum that
complies with European standards is the
fact that presently about , foreigners
have the status of refugees in Ukraine, and
over  countries, which is significantly
greater than the number of refugees with
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official status in neighbouring EU candidate
countries.
The Law of Ukraine “On immigration” leg1
islatively ensures a clear and transparent
procedure for issuing permits for foreigners
and persons without citizenship to immi1
grate to Ukraine; earlier this was absent
(performed according to agency instruc1
tions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs).
Along with totally justified control measures
for immigration that should make impossi1
ble the arrival on the territory of the country
of foreigners who represent a threat to
national security or the health or morality of
citizens, the law provides guarantees against
violations of the human rights of migrants
and the possibility of immigration on the
basis of family reunification, which applies
not only to members of families of citizens
of Ukraine but also to refugees and immi1
grants residing on the territory of the coun1
try. A significant guarantee of these rights is
the right to appeal a decision to refuse to
grant permission for immigration in the
courts, the possibility of submitting repeat
applications, etc.
In establishing a mechanism for legal immi1
gration, the law is also aimed at illegal immi1
gration. At the same time, taking into con1
sideration the realities of the transition peri1
od and the existence in the country of for1
eigners with undetermined status, the con1
cluding provisions of the law establish that
all the residence permits granted prior to its
coming into effect remain valid; moreover,
persons who arrived pursuant to the agree1
ment between the USSR and Vietnam about
employment of citizens, and who remained
in Ukraine actually on an illegal situation
after the collapse of the single state, have the
right to apply for permission to immigrate
to Ukraine, and also persons from the war
zones of Abkhazia in the Georgian Republic
who were granted temporary asylum pur1
suant to a decision of the Ukrainian execu1
tive government. These decisions can be
regarded as a certain type of partial immi1
gration amnesty.
At the same time, significant efforts are
being put into strengthening control meas1
ures with the aim of combating illegal migra1
tion. The presidential decree dated 
 January  approved another pro1
gramme to combat illegal migration for
–. In January , the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine
“On amending certain legislative acts of
Ukraine on combating illegal migration”,
which significantly increased fines for for1
eigners violating the rules for staying, and also
the responsibility was increased for organisers
of illegal transfer of people across borders,
and of citizens of Ukraine and Ukrainian
legal entities for facilitating such violations
and providing services to illegal migrants.
With the adoption of this law, changes were
made to Article  of the Law of Ukraine
“On the legal status of foreigners”, which
regulates the procedure for expelling for1
eigners and persons without citizenship
from Ukraine. The new redaction establish1
es that foreigners who committed a crime or
administrative violation may be expelled
from Ukraine. Decisions on expulsion can
also be taken regarding foreigners whose
actions grossly violate the legislation on the
status of foreigners or contradicts the inter1
ests of ensuring the security of Ukraine or
the preservation of public order. At the
same time, an important innovation that
corresponds to international requirements
of protecting human rights is the fact that
foreigners or persons without citizenship
can appeal decisions on expulsion to the
courts, which suspends the execution of
these decisions.
A whole series of documents which have
been adopted recently or which are being
developed in Ukraine are devoted to guaran1
tees of freedom of movement. First among
them is the Decree of the President of
Ukraine dated  June  “On additional
measures regarding the realisation of the
human right of freedom of movement and
free choice of residency”. Accordingly, the
procedure has been cancelled of registering
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foreigners arriving in Ukraine at internal
affairs authorities by residency location. As
of  July , foreigners from countries
with a visa1free regime should apply to MIA
agencies only if their stay in the country
extends beyond  days, while citizens of
countries for whom entry in Ukraine neces1
sitates a visa need to apply after the visa
deadline expires. Thus, the registration of
foreigners who are temporarily staying on
the territory of Ukraine should take place
only when they are crossing the state bor1
der.
This decree also anticipated a series of meas1
ures that aims to cancel the propyska, which
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in its
turn recognised as contradicting the basic
law of the state. Another decree of the
President of Ukraine approves the tempo1
rary procedure for registering citizens that
has been implemented instead of the propy1
ska, and gives a mandate to the executive
government to prepare and submit a draft
law on the registration procedure for discus1
sion by the parliament.
Significant harmonisation of Ukrainian
legislation in the area of migration to gen1
erally recognised international norms and
standards have allowed the state to join the
 UN Convention and  Protocol on
Refugee Status. The corresponding Law of
Ukraine was adopted by the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine on  January .
Yet another confirmation of Ukraine’s
achievements in establishing and improving
legislation in the field of migration in accor1
dance with international requirements can
be considered to be the adoption of our
country as a full1fledged member of the
International Organisation for Migration
(IOM), which occurred at the last IOM ses1
sion in the fall of  (Ukraine had observ1
er status at the IOM since ).
One of the important preconditions for ful1
filling legislation at the level of European
standards is the existence of necessary
administrative bodies and providing them
appropriate authorisation. Today, most func1
tions of regulating migration are fulfilled by
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
Decrees of the President of Ukraine charge it
with co1ordinating the efforts of executive
government bodies for the prevention of ille1
gal migration, and fulfilling the recently
adopted laws of Ukraine “On citizenship of
Ukraine” and “On immigration”. Fulfilment
of the Law of Ukraine “On refugees” should
be ensured by the State Committee of
Ukraine on Nationalities and Migration;
repeated reorganisations of this entity testify
that efforts continue to find the most accept1
able forms of providing assistance to
refugees. The agenda includes reforming
the Frontier Troops of Ukraine into a law1
enforcement agency that complies with EU
standards. Plans also include rejuvenating a
special department on labour migration in
the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy.
Overall, the issue remains of optimising the
structure of executive government bodies in
the sphere of regulating migration process1
es, particularly concentrating the appropri1
ate functions in a single central executive
body, i.e., creating a State Migration Service
of Ukraine.
The institutional problem is not the only one
to emerge in conjunction with implement1
ing Ukrainian legislation in the sphere of
migration. The issue of personnel qualifica1
tions continues to be an urgent one. During
recent years much has been done to train
civil servants working in the migration
sphere, assisted by international organisa1
tions (UNHCR, IOM) and by EU member
countries (Germany, Sweden). Appropriate
courses have started to be taught in a series
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of higher educational institutions, including
those who train officers of the Border Army
and militia. Training of personnel and study1
ing the work experience of relevant agencies
of countries who have acquired significant
experience in regulating migration process1
es and accepting refugees remains an impor1
tant objective for Ukraine for co1operation
with the EU and candidate countries.
The financial difficulties of the state are an
obstacle to the full and comprehensive
implementation of Ukrainian policy in the
migration sphere. Specialised facilities have
still not been created for detaining illegal
migrants until their status in the country is
determined or they are returned to their
fatherland. Due to the lack of funds, there is
practically no system for deporting foreign1
ers who have no justification to stay in the
country. Only one station has been opened
for accommodating refugees, with  spaces
that certainly do not satisfy existing
demand. Ukraine needs help in resolving
these issues, including financial ones. To say
it more broadly, this assistance should aim to
facilitate the integration of immigrants in
Ukraine.
Unfortunately, it must be noted that while it
provides rather broad legislative possibili1
ties for foreigners and persons without citi1
zenship to receive refugee status and also
Ukrainian citizenship, the state actually pro1
vides no support in the sphere of settling
and integrating these people into Ukrainian
society. As a result, even among the most
protected foreigners in the legal sense, that
is, those who have a residency certificate or
are officially recognised to be refugees, a sig1
nificant number continue to regard
Ukraine as a transit country and strive to
leave for the West.
The lack of integration programmes is
linked both to the lack of funds and the lack
of appropriate experience or societal com1
prehension of the necessity of purposeful
integration measures, which would be in the
interests of both the immigrants and of soci1
ety as a whole. At the same time, Ukraine has
already acquired unique and unequivocally
positive experience in accepting and set1
tling in their historical homeland a category
of repatriates such as those deported during
Stalinist times because of their nationality—
Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Armenians,
Greeks, and Germans, who have returned to
Crimea. The expansion of this experience
to measures to integrate other categories of
migrants could bring positive results; and
the active support of integration activity on
the part of European partners would
strengthen it.
An important and perhaps even a deciding
factor which inevitably should change the
attitude of the state to integrating migrants
is the demographic situation in Ukraine.
Unfavourable demographic trends resulting
in the steep drop in population and which
in the nearest future could halt economic
development will force a review of migra1
tion policy, as has already taken place in the
neighbouring Russian Federation, which
has come upon analogous demographic
problems and selected immigration as one
of the means of combating them.
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Conclusions from the above information
may briefly be reduced to the following:
• Despite all difficulties and controversy,
the process of EU expansion shall have
a generally positive effect on Ukraine.
It is forcing the management of the
country, leading political forces and
the public, to realistically assess the sit1
uation of the country, the results of
reforms, and to put effort into reduc1
ing the distance between Ukraine and
Europe.
• In the migration sphere, the introduc1
tion of visas by neighbouring countries
and the threat of restriction of move1
ment across borders by citizens, as well as
the demographic situation inside the
country, prompts the authorities to sub1
stantially work on forming an effective
national migration policy.
• The EU should comprehend the necessi1
ty of involving Ukraine more broadly in
the resolution of common problems,
above all those which represent a threat
to Ukraine’s national interests and those
of candidate countries.
• Given the complexity and diversity of
consequences of EU expansion for migra1
tion processes in Ukraine, this problem is
worthy of more detailed and profound
study, above all in border regions. Its
results could be particularly significant if
such research was conducted on both
sides of the border using a common
methodology, which would allow the pos1
sibility of comparing the results.
Conclusions and recommendations 
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Opinions of local leaders
representing border communities
towards the presentday western
borders of Ukraine
Olena HOUMENYUK
This report presents public opinion on the
general situation in Ukraine’s western bor1
derland. In this region, borders are a part of
the everyday experience of both people and
institutions, in addition to being influenced
by the national government and by the for1
eign policies of other countries. In the near1
est future, inhabitants of this area will be
faced with the fact of new secured borders
and the introduction of visa regimes with
countries where they used to travel freely.
Although this will not be a new experience
for Ukrainians, the change will affect indi1
viduals as well as whole groups, communi1
ties, and institutions located in the border
region that will have to respond to the
changed role of the secured border.
In consequence of the nature of the future
change, combined with the social and cul1
tural challenges in the region, the attitudes
of inhabitants of Ukraine’s western border1
lands towards the border will be taken into
account as the data for our analysis and fore1
cast. These areas can be considered as a kind
of laboratory, in which cultural and civilisa1
tion processes—significant not only to
Ukraine but also to neighbouring coun1
tries—will be demonstrated. Such a laborato1
ry will make it possible to determine empiri1
cally if, and to what extent, the individuals,
institutions, and entire communities that
are the most familiar with border issues are
mentally and psychologically prepared for
the forthcoming changes. It will also
demonstrate what types of mental blocks
(fears, prejudices) can be expected from the
groups that do not share the experience of
the borderland people.
Taking into account the peculiarities of
Ukraine’s ethnic and state history, it is worth
mentioning some of the features of its west1
ern ’laboratory’. On the one hand, the west1
ern border of Ukraine is frequently consid1
ered to be the frontier of Eastern civilisation
in the cultural, religious, political, and legal
sense. On the other hand, this border con1
nects rather than divides communities with
similar and relatively recent state history
and civilisation experience. In the s,
those communities began the process of dis1
engagement from the socialist state’s organ1
isational, political, and industrial structures.
On the above grounds, empirical research
into the social attitudes towards change in
the nature of the border should be useful to
politicians and the public1at1large. In our
opinion, some type of research that focuses
on public opinion as well as on individual
and collective life strategies adopted by peo1
ple in the region would be of particular rel1
evance.
The opinions and attitudes towards the situ1
ation on the border, and to possible change
manifested by people who perform func1
tions and roles that are important for local
communities, are particularly interesting. In
other words, members of the local elite are
noteworthy, because their points of view and
actions are particularly visible in the public
eye and often serve as an example for the
attitudes and actions of other members of
the community.
This report deals with the attitudes and reac1
tions of representatives of two local commu1
nities of the western borderland—Lviv oblast
and Transcarpathia oblast—to the following:
• the present1day social situation directly
connected with the openness of the west1
ern border,
• the projected effects of securing
Ukraine’s western border on the western
borderlands, when the border will in the
near future become the frontier between
the European Union’s and Ukraine’s
external borders.
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Introductory remarks
Those beliefs should be given particular
attention, due to the fact that they remain
under the direct influence of the vicinity of
the state borders, whose functioning will
soon undergo a rather radical change. This
change will indeed be radical, because it
will practically divide the countries
involved after the enlargement of the
European Union.
We are also interested in the attitudes and
opinions in question because they are creat1
ed and popularised by social entities (indi1
vidual and collective ones) that are situated
in a broadly understood border region along1
side the present1day official western border of
Ukraine. Their substance relates to those bor1
ders and to their nearer and more distant
environs.
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The research forming the foundations of
the report was fielded in the first half of
September  and was based on the inter1
view method (and, to a lesser extent, on the
observation method). It was carried out in
accordance with a qualitative research
methodology, which is typical for humanis1
tic sociology and social anthropology. This
technique was selected because of its best
correspondence to our basic research goals;
specifically, it makes it possible to reach
’deeper layers of consciousness’ than the
survey type of research.
The empirical basis of the research was pro1
vided by interviews (which typically lasted
over an hour) with groups of opinion lead1
ers representing selected local communi1
ties in the western borderland, namely
those of Lviv and Transcarpathia oblasts.
Respondents were selected on the sugges1
tion of:
• representatives of local authorities
(selection of elite by the elite itself);
• residents of the area;
• interviewers who come from and are
familiar with the given border region.
One should add that the selected respon1
dents may be considered experts in at least
one of the three dimensions in which the sit1
uation in the borderland can be perceived,
i.e., the economic, sociocultural, and politi1
cal dimensions.
The interviews were held in the form of free
conversation, which was, however, conduct1
ed according to a precisely developed sce1
nario. It should also be added that persons
were included in each of the research teams
who came from the given area and were well
familiar with the situation and specifics of
the researched region. This was helpful in
the selection of interviewees and in animat1
ing the interview, particularly in the case of
delicate talks on sensitive subjects such as
national and religious identification and
participation in the ’grey’ economic area
and in other illegal activities.
Taking into account the above factors,
respondents represented different social
and professional categories. The respon1
dent list included the following categories
of persons:
• representatives of local authorities (cen1
tral administration) and local self1gov1
ernment (councillors);
• local entrepreneurs engaged in:
— typical border region economic activity
(import1export),
— activity not connected directly with
import1export but still based in the bor1
derland,
— individual activity or running a family
firm or a medium1sized company;
• representatives of organisations and
minority associations;
• members of national minorities (includ1
ing immigrant settlers from neighbour1
ing countries);
• clergy of different religious denomina1
tions (depending on the religious
denomination pattern in a given munici1
pality).
 policy studies #, JANUARY 
Basic research information
Brief information on methodology
Interviews were conducted, as already stated
beforehand, according to a scenario whose
form and substance were precisely devel1
oped.
From the formal point of view, the inter1
view was divided into two parts: () the
main section, which was identical for all
the respondents; and () the variable, com1
plementary section, depending on the type
of respondent. Complementary scenarios
were developed separately for each of the
above1mentioned categories of respon1
dents.
In terms of the substance of the interview,
according to the pre1planned scenario, it
consisted of several thematic blocs (relating
both to the permanent and the variable sec1
tion of the interview).
The first thematic bloc contained questions
concerning the period when entrance to
neighbouring countries did not require a
visa, namely, the present1day situation at
Ukraine’s western border.
The second thematic bloc contained ques1
tions on the period following the introduc1
tion of a visa regime, e.g., on the effects of
the introduction of mandatory visas by
Poland and Hungary (Slovakia has already
introduced its visa regime) on their borders
with western neighbours.
The third thematic bloc contained ques1
tions oriented at obtaining a deeper under1
standing of economic processes relating to
the situation on the state border and in the
border region.
The fourth thematic bloc contained ques1
tions aimed at revealing sociocultural phe1
nomena associated with the situation on the
state border and in the border region.
The fifth thematic bloc included questions
which directly relate to political and legal
matters in connection with the situation on
the state border and in the border regions.
This bloc contained questions which were
directed only at local politicians who repre1
sented either local government or the cen1
tral administration.
It should be emphasised that the last three
thematic blocs, which we underlined due to
the type of dominant characterisation of
the situation on the border and in the bor1
der regions, overlap with the two thematic
blocs which had been presented before,
and are based on the time criterion.
The interviews with selected representatives
of the two local communities of the western
borderland were intended to:
• Firstly, diagnose the social attitudes of
the local elite towards the present1day sit1
uation in the borderland.
• Secondly, determine the ways in which
the respondents perceive the effect of
such a policy on their local communities.
• Thirdly, project their image of the ’situa1
tion on the western border’ of Ukraine
with both Poland and Hungary after it
becomes ’secured’ in accordance with
European Union requirements and
Schengen rules, and to elicit what type of
public feeling they expect in their com1
munities.
This general research task was carried out
with the use of relevant data collected
through interviews, observations, and from
monographs in three separate albeit com1
plementary dimensions, namely economic,
social and political. Division of the gener1
al analysis into three detailed ones, con1
cerning each of the dimensions individu1
ally, allows, in our opinion, for a better
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characterisation of social attitudes towards
changes at the western border. Therefore, in
this report, we present our analysis of the
empirical material in three parts. The first
part concerns the economic dimension of
the situation at the border, the second one
touches the sociocultural dimension of that
situation, and the third one deals with its
political dimension.
Economic: In the first part, dealing with
economic factors, we analyse cross1border
economic cooperation and its social and
civilising effects on the region and its lead1
ing actors.
Social and cultural: In our second1part analy1
sis of sociocultural factors, we concentrate
on the social situation at the border and its
impact on social ties, particularly family ties
between persons on the two sides of the bor1
der. While analysing this second dimension,
we take into consideration the character of
those ties and their dependence on the
openness or closure of the border. We also
consider the factors which enable continu1
ous cross1border cultural cooperation (for1
mal and informal ones) between individuals,
groups, and organisations.
Political: While dealing with political factors
in the final third part of the analysis, the
focus of our research becomes the system of
central and local administration in the
Ukrainian borderland. We approach the sit1
uation at the border—both the present and
the future one—from three perspectives:
• firstly, from the point of view of the inter1
action between the central and local gov1
ernments in the borderland;
• secondly, from the perspective of differ1
ent forms of inter1regional cooperation
between organisational units (munici1
palities) on the two sides of the border;
• thirdly, from the perspective of the rela1
tions between different units of local
government and the central administra1
tion in the context of the new border
policy.
This part of report explores the opinions of
individuals who live in the Transcarpathia
region, and their feelings towards the bor1
derlands of the Slovak Republic and
Hungary. Transcarpathia shares a unique
historical experience with these neighbour1
ing countries; there is a very close social and
cultural relationship between these coun1
tries and the region. This report will exam1
ine the historical and geographical factors
that contribute to the special relationship
that is shared by Transcarpathia and these
regions. These historical and geographical
factors help to explain many of the current
feelings and attitudes towards these border1
land countries. A special focus will be made
on the reaction of individuals in
Transcarpathia to the possible enforcement
of a visa regime between the Hungarian and
Ukrainian borders. The effects of the pres1
ent1day visa regime enforced in Slovakia will
also be examined.
Hungarians are a large minority group in
this region, and Slovakians also make up
another, smaller, ethnic minority. These
groups are well organised and have many
contacts with their homeland. The numer1
ous Hungarians have many activities in
which they cross the border into Hungary.
These groups have much support from the
Hungarian government in pursuit of their
cultural activities. If a visa regime was
imposed, there would be a cost to obtain the
visa. Members of minority culture organisa1
tions are not extremely worried about the
cost of a visa, as these costs would be
endured by the organisations. This is not the
case with individuals; the cost of a visa is a
determining factor for the average individ1
ual. It may be too expensive for an average
individual to purchase a visa every time
he/she wants to cross the border.
Of the respondents interviewed, many
agree with the statement that a closed bor1
der would hit the economy hardest. Many
individuals make a living by crossing the
border to work. Also, many are involved in
trading between the two countries; a closed
border would certainly affect their income.
Tourism makes up an important part of the
economy in the Transcarpathia region. A
closed border would make it more difficult
for tourists from across the border to visit
this region.
This paper also examines the opinions of
the few respondents who feel that a closed
border will have a positive affect on the
economy. A closed border will permit the
large “shadow” economy, which today is a
reality along the border, to be decreased.
This will benefit business owners who have
to compete with the cheaper prices on items
in the shadow economy. There is also the
hope that a closed border would increase
the demand for Ukrainian products. Given
that there are short1term and long1term
effects to a closed1border regime, time must
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pass before any proper conclusions can be
made. This paper will conclude by dis1
cussing the perceived notions of what the
short and long1term effects of a visa regime
system would be for the Western Ukraine’s
affected regions.
The relationship that the Transcarpathia
region has with both Hungary and Slovakia
is very close with respect to social and cul1
tural cooperation and contacts. This coop1
eration is obvious in the case of Hungry, as
the border between these two countries is
still open.
Specifically, there are some historical and
geographical conditions which allow for a
high level of cooperation between Ukraine
and its neighbouring countries in the west1
ern region.
First of all, Transcarpathia only joined the
Ukrainian SSR in , in the border
changes which happened after the Second
World War; during this period, Ukraine was
a part of the Soviet Union. Before , dif1
ferent parts of Transcarpathia were either
under Czechoslovakian or Hungarian rule.
After the Transcarpathia region became a
part of Ukraine, the government of the
USSR imposed a new border with
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Unfortu1
nately, the border was artificial, and the
USSR did not take into account the distri1
bution of different ethnic groups on this
territory. As a result, the border created by
the Soviet Union divided whole ethnic com1
munities of Ukrainians, Hungarians,
Romanians, and Slovaks. As a result,
Transcarpathia has a large ethnic minority
of Hungarians (about –%) and also a
smaller ethnic minority of Slovaks (about
.%). On the other side, there are large
Ukrainians minorities in Hungary and,
especially, Slovakia.
Secondly, there is the specific geographical
disposition of the Transcarpathia region.
Transcarpathia is detached from other
regions of Ukraine by the Carpathian
Mountains, which, coupled with poor trans1
port connections, limits the contacts
between this region and other parts of
Ukraine. This geographic difficulty with the
rest of Ukraine makes cooperation between
Transcarpathia and other borderland
regions more natural and convenient. For
example, the train ride to Ukraine’s capital,
Kyiv, takes approximately  hours, whereas
the border with the Slovak Republic is just
beyond the city line of Uzhhorod, the oblast
or regional administrative centre (and the
city where our interviews were conducted).
As a consequence of its specific historical
background, this region’s inhabitants have
strong family ties with neighbouring coun1
tries. First of all, according to the respon1
dents, almost all the members of ethnic
minorities, both Hungarian and Slovak,
have relatives in neighbouring countries.
On the other hand, a significant part of the
Ukrainian population also has relatives
among the Ukrainians living in Slovakia and
Hungary, and the respondents claim that
their number is not less than among the oth1
ers. For example, the Ukrainian minority in
Slovakia is very developed, and the organ1
ised community tries to preserve Ukrainian
culture. Taking to account the fact that the
border was changed in , most of the rel1
atives are near, and family contacts are still
intensive.
The respondents also draw attention to
another reason for the intensification of
social cooperation based on family contacts,
namely, to international marriages between
citizens of neighbouring countries. Marriage
is the most common reason for emigrating
to a neighbouring country. When couples of
different citizenship get married, it is likely
that they will leave Ukraine and settle down
in the neighbouring country.
Also, respondents frequently mentioned
that due to the fact that the different ethnic
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groups have lived together on this territory
for a long time, most of the inhabitants of
Transcarpathia speak or at least understand
the ethnic minorities’ languages, namely
Slovakian or Hungarian. Thus, knowledge
of foreign languages and intensive family
contacts enlarge the scope of cooperation
between peoples of neighbouring coun1
tries—not only in the cultural dimension,
but also influencing business cooperation in
a positive way. Moreover, having this knowl1
edge of foreign languages allows youth the
possibility to obtain an education in
Slovakia or Hungary.
Some respondents mentioned emigrating
to the neighbouring country as a negative
aspect of such close relationships with
neighbours, because often the emigrants
leaving Ukraine are highly qualified spe1
cialists, like physicians, teachers, musicians,
etc.
Another aspect of cross1border cultural
cooperation is the activity of organisations
representing the Hungarian and Slovak
ethnic minorities in Ukraine. Despite the
substantial difference between them, with
the Hungarian minority being ten times
larger than the Slovakian minority, there
are five Slovak organisations in the region.
These organisations mostly engage in cul1
tural, educational, and publishing activi1
ties.
Due to the fact that Hungarians are a large
ethnic minority in the region, they have over
 organisations, and the scale of their activ1
ity is much broader. Among their activities
are participating in conferences, festivals,
and other events that take place in Hungary.
These groups also organise local cultural
events for members of their minority, as well
as the publishing of books, Hungarian news1
papers, and different types of educational
activities, like student and teacher
exchanges. The respondents who represent1
ed one of the most active Hungarian organ1
isations claimed that it conducts nearly 
such events and programs per year; as well,
that they were invited six times to Hungary
for cultural events during the first half of
this year. In general, they noted that the
Hungarian government completely sup1
ports the cultural life of their minority in
the Transcarpathia region.
Almost all the interviewed respondents
wanted to emphasise during the conversa1
tion the very tolerant and friendly coexis1
tence between all ethnic minorities and the
Ukrainian majority in the region, and the
absence of any kind of national conflict.
They perceive such coexistence mostly as
advantageous for both sides. The represen1
tatives of minority organisations also
expressed this opinion and highly appreciat1
ed the support of their activity from local
authorities.
Social and cultural dimension
The respondents were divided in their opin1
ion about the consequences of securing the
border. Almost all perceived it as a negative
thing for the borderland region, but some
respondents claimed that the changes would
not greatly affect the relationship between
local communities. For example, they
referred to the experience of securing the
border with Slovakia; however, these respon1
dents did recognise that the close of the bor1
der with Hungary could cause more prob1
lems because of the more intense coopera1
tion between Transcarpathia and Hungary.
To summarise the respondents’ opinions,
securing the border will not hinder the
strong institutional forms of cooperation,
including economic cooperation, between
cultural or educational institutions. It will
not be a problem for businesses or organisa1
tions that actively cooperate with cross1bor1
der counterparts to pay for visas. However, it
could hamper individual contacts, i.e., fam1
#, JANUARY  policy studies 
Securing the border
ily contacts, because income levels are
rather low in the region and the cost of a visa
can be a real obstacle for the residents. For
example, the priest of a Greek Catholic
church that serves nearly % of all such
parishes in this region will have a problem,
because the pilgrimage to Hungary that
happens several times a year will have to be
stopped after the closure of the border. In
general, the respondents expected that
almost all persons who now frequently visit
Hungary would have to apply for a visa in
order to continue their activity there.
Some of the respondents—even realising the
disadvantages of implementing visa require1
ments for their region and for ordinary resi1
dents—generally expressed their understand1
ing of the inevitability and general necessity
of this step. The respondents realised that
visa requirements are aimed at building a
more civilised and regulated form of cooper1
ation with neighbouring countries. On the
other hand, due to the specific history and
disposition of this region, the inhabitants
have a special way of life and perception of
their relationship to Europe. Importantly,
they consider themselves as being more
European than other Ukrainians. Therefore,
they fear being isolated from Europe because
of the border, and now they have nothing to
do but wait until Ukraine also enters the EU.
In general, respondents mentioned two
main problem concerning securing the bor1
der. The first one was connected with the
cost of visas, which is expensive for some
categories of Ukrainians; and the second
was connected with the difficulties of
obtaining a visa. They foresee that long and
complex procedures on the border will
decrease the number of spontaneous cross1
border trips.
There is a significant difference between the
Hungarian and Slovakian borders concern1
ing this aspect of the problem, because the
number of applicants for visas to Hungary
will be much higher. Therefore, the respon1
dents fear that the Hungarian consulate will
be coping with a large volume of applica1
tions for the first several months.
Representatives of local authorities
This group of interviewees was selected
from among the local government, regional
(oblast) government, and state administra1
tion of Transcarpathia oblast, as well as rep1
resentatives of the Transcarpathia Special
Economic Zone. The respondents were
selected on the basis of their positions,
given that the departments they work in deal
directly with the problems of cross1border
cooperation.
Transcarpathia borders four Eastern1
European countries: Hungary, the Slovak
Republic, Romania, and Poland. All the
respondents felt that these shared borders
have a direct impact on government policy,
economic development, and people’s
lifestyles. Among the most essential char1
acteristics of the region’s borderland posi1
tion named by respondents were the fol1
lowing:
Economic dimension
• Transit money. The region gains money
from car and tourist transit through the
border and its territory.
• Tourism. There are a lot of historical
sights in the region, in addition to the
Carpathian Mountains, that are great for
tourists. That is why tourism is viewed by
many respondents as one of the major
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at the borderland
 Papariga Yaroslav, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Department in Uzhhorod, first secretary.
spheres of revenues for the region.
Tourists from border countries constitute
the majority of the region’s international
tourists.
• Investment. The historical ties with
Slovakia and Hungary, along with the
close geographical situation, stimulate
investments into the economy of the
region. In other words, it is easier and
more comfortable for Slovakia and
Hungary to invest money in the territo1
ries they are familiar with and that are
near their own country.
• Employment. Transcarpathia has one of
the highest levels of unemployment in
Ukraine; and many people make their liv1
ing from cross1border trade. Differences
in the prices of goods and their availabil1
ity are turned to traders’ advantage.
During last year, much of the population
of the region made their living by work1
ing legally or semi1legally in compa1
nies/enterprises in neighbouring coun1
tries.
• Cross1border trade. A large percent of
the local population is heavily involved
in cross1border trade; this is the most
common way for people to cooperate.
Nevertheless, the respondents noted
that the situation with cross1border
trade has been changing during the past
year, with cross1border trade now having
become more civilised. This is a conse1
quence of increased prosperity, with
some traders prospering enough to
move on from retail sales to wholesale
trading, while increasing the variety of
what they offer and the value of their
goods. Thus, cross1border trade now
takes place not only between agents
(individuals) but also between small and
medium enterprises.
Administrative dimension
• Departments of cross1border coopera1
tion were created not long ago within the
structure of local governments and the
state administration.
• National and local governments cooper1
ate with neighbouring country govern1
ments on the basis of Transcarpathia
regional treaties. Respondents empha1
sised that the most active cooperation has
appeared between this region and cities
of Slovakia such as Kosice, Mihailovce,
Bratislava, and Hungarian cities such as
Budapest, Nyiregyhaza.
• The state administration regularly organ1
ises “good1neighbour days”, which have
become a real step towards cultural and
political understanding.
• Local government takes part in visa
preparation.
People’s lifestyle
• Many inhabitants of Transcarpathia have
families, friends and acquaintances
across the border.
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• Also, there are many Slovak and
Hungarian communities on the territory
of the region.
• It was pointed out that minorities have
more preferable living situations on the
borderland, because they have a higher
possibility to communicate with their
native ethnoses.
• Nowadays, mixed marriages seem to be
a natural matter, because these nations
have been living together for many
years.
The respondents draw attention to this, as
well as to the interesting consequence that
the mentality of the local population com1
bines the national characteristics of neigh1
bouring nations. Moreover, most respon1
dents characterised this feature (being a
borderland) as being a favourable one.
Among the advantages of the borderland the
respondents often named the following:
• Historical ties and close geographic situ1
ation make it easier to access invest1
ments;
• Ability of the population to be employed
in neighbour countries or to be involved
in cross1border trade;
• Development of cross1border trade at the
level of small, medium, and big business1
es with neighbour countries;
• Having a lot of historical sights and the
Carpathian Mountains, Transcarpathia is
a great place for tourists, especially
because of its close location to European
countries;
• The region gains income from car and
tourist transit through its territory;
• The European mentality of the local pop1
ulation, including property owners and
law1abiding citizens;
• The local population can speak several
languages;
• Cultural and academic exchanges are
easy to access from other regions of
Ukraine because of the direct connec1
tions.
Among the disadvantages of being on the
borderland, respondents named the follow1
ing most often:
• Labour migration from neighbour coun1
tries, which causes a rise in the level of
crime in the region;
• The region is a transit territory, and this
causes several ecological problems;
• Cross1border trade restrains the develop1
ment of Ukrainian manufacturing pro1
duction.
Introduction of a visa regime
The introduction of visa regime on the bor1
der with Slovakia, and possible introduction
of one at the Hungarian border, were strong1
ly criticised by most respondents. Such a neg1
ative attitude was explained by the respon1
dents using the following arguments:
• It will slow the economic development of
the region.
The respondents pointed out that it would
have a most harmful impact on small and
medium1size enterprises, because visas
might be quite expensive and difficult to get
for them. Thus, it will reduce cross1border
trade and make it accessible only to big
enterprises.
 policy studies #, JANUARY 
 Papariga, op. cit.
 Nuser, op. cit.
Also, introducing a visa regime will probably
increase unemployment in the region at
first. However, many respondents predicted
that in the long term, the Ukrainian labour
force will be able to reorient, which hap1
pened after the implementation of visas on
the Slovak border.
A significant number of respondents stated
that “closing the border” will negatively
effect tourism and service spheres, which
now bring great benefits to the local budg1
et.
• Introduction of the visa regime might
raise social problems. It is common for
family members from Transcarpathia to
work abroad in Hungary or Slovakia; a
visa regime would make it more difficult
for them to communicate. Also, it would
be more difficult for relatives and nation1
al minorities to visit their families
abroad.
• Many respondents were afraid that it
would reduce cultural and academic
exchanges; they mentioned such prob1
lems after the “closing” of the Slovak bor1
der.
Nevertheless, respondents predicted that
the number of Ukrainian citizens who will
want to get (Hungarian) visas would be quite
high. They also said that the number of peo1
ple who get visas to Slovakia fell since the
implementation of the visa regime, but not
significantly.
Respondents, even though they were strong1
ly negative about closing the border, also
named several potentially positive effects:
• It will stop chaotic cross1border trade
such as smuggling;
• It will stop the transition of labour
migrants;
• It will re1orient Ukrainian enterprises
from raw material trade to own produc1
tion, which will develop the economy of
the country and the region in the long
term.
Most of the respondents expressed strong
negative opinions on the introduction of a
visa regime, which they augmented with
future negative economic and social effects.
Moreover, they emphasised that such effects
will be experienced on both sides of the bor1
der.
Only a few respondents drew attention to
the possible positive effects that could
appear with the introduction of visa
regimes. They also pointed out that such
positive effect could be experienced only in
the long term.
Economic dimension
The surveyed people in Uzhhorod perceive
the situation, when the borders of Ukraine
with Slovakia and Hungary are not secured,
in economic, social, cultural and political
terms. This study covers all these dimen1
sions, however, we start with the economic
aspect, which seems to be especially impor1
tant in the context of the region, while
social, cultural and political issues will be
discussed later.
The respondents perceive the western bor1
der and the borderland from the perspec1
tive of their influence on:
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when the western borders of Ukraine are not secured
 In fact, the situation when the Ukrainian1Slovakian and Ukrainian1Hungarian borders were not
secured has passed. Today anyone who wants to enter Slovakia needs an entrance visa.
• total income of individuals and families
and their income sources, standards of
living in Uzhhorod;
• financial situation in different entities;
• the economic situation in the town,
region and in the country.
Respondents emphasised that the financial
situation of a significant number of individu1
als and families directly depends on cross1bor1
der activities. Transparent borders allow them
to get a better job in the bordering states, as
well as the possibility to arbitrage prices.
Respondents’ estimates of the fraction of indi1
viduals who are involved in cross1border
trade, smuggling, and job seeking were quite
different; however, they all agreed that for
many people in the oblast with little regular
work, it was the only source of income.
A location close to the borders creates
opportunities not only for individuals, but
for businesses as well. Respondents often
stressed that Transcarpathia oblast is sepa1
rated from the rest of Ukraine by the
Carpathians Mountains, and that it is much
easier to get to Budapest and Bratislava than
to Kyiv. So, their enterprises are much more
oriented on international cooperation than
are enterprises in other regions of Ukraine.
Businesses on the Ukrainian side of the bor1
der participate in different types of cooper1
ation:
• export and import of goods and services;
• import of technologies, know1how;
• import of capital.
Small distances to neighbouring countries
create obvious benefits to businesses in the
area of export and import of goods and serv1
ices, namely, low transportation costs and
relatively large markets. It determined the
profile of these firms for some time.
However, close relations and small distances
are an advantage not only for the transfer of
goods but also for the transfer of knowl1
edge, technologies, and capital. A majority
of respondents from the business sector said
that they have no permanent employees
who are citizens of foreign countries; never1
theless, they often hire temporary, usually
task1oriented, foreign consultants. Some
managers mentioned that they get benefits
from employing workers who improved
their qualifications abroad. Most business1
men also stated that their location helps
them to adopt new technologies, because if
something goes wrong it is always possible to
go across the border and see how it works
there.
Respondents believed that geographical
location is an important determinant in
many investment decisions. Examples are
the “Eurocar” assembly plant, the cable pro1
duction company “Madish and Madish”,
and recent project of “Inter Group Auto”,
worth about  million USD.
As we can see, neighbouring countries influ1
ence both legal entities and individuals, giv1
ing them additional opportunities.
However, respondents reported that prob1
lems resulted from the borderland location,
as well. Some of the problems reported were
objective; different kinds of respondents
were concerned with them. These were the
usual disadvantages of increased traffic,
delays, illegal migrants and their camps, etc.
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 “Do they cooperate? They look for a job there... It is cooperation and business, petty trade. Many peo1
ple make money by selling petrol in the bordering countries (because petrol is cheaper in Ukraine) and
by buying food there and selling it in Ukraine (it might be surprising, but food is cheaper in Slovakia
than in Ukraine).”—Businessman .
 Although it is not very important for this study to distinguish between legal and illegal activities, we
would like to point out that cross1border trade is not illegal per se in Ukraine. Only some of the goods
brought to Ukraine from the bordering counties are smuggled.
Another group of problems was reported
only by businessmen operating a legal entity.
They claimed they suffered from competi1
tion related to cross1border activity.
Construction companies find it hard to hire
qualified workers in Ukraine, because they
can find a better1paid job in Slovakia; and
retailers have problems selling products
because the same products can be bought
from individual traders, who do not pay cus1
toms duty and therefore can ask lower prices.
Although it is hard to estimate the overall eco1
nomic effect in numbers from cross1border
cooperation, we, as well as our respondents,
believe that despite some problems that have
an offsetting effect, cooperation with neigh1
bouring countries improves the welfare of the
given town, region, and the entire country.
Securing the western borders –
evidence and forecasts
In this part of the paper, we present the
opinions of inhabitants of Uzhhorod regard1
ing the changes on Ukraine’s western bor1
ders. The situation in Uzhhorod is unique,
because the town is situated near the
Slovakian border and not far from the
Hungarian one. The Slovakian border has
already been secured, while Hungary is
expected to introduce visa requirements
soon; thus, it is easy to compare the borders
with different status.
Economic dimension
In the previous part of the paper, we showed
the importance of cross1border cooperation
for the region. In this part, we analyse the
viewpoints and forecasts of our respondents
regarding the introduction of the visa regime.
The economic consequences of the secured
borders are the most common concern of
the respondents. Although they expect a
negative effect on cross1border cooperation,
we do think it is worthwhile to additionally
distinguish between the short1run and long1
run effects, as well as the different effects on
petty traders, relatively large businesses, and
the economy as a whole.
Although most of the interviewed people
focused on the short1run effects, which are
very likely to be negative, only two groups of
people would lose permanently in both the
short and the long run—petty, usually unoffi1
cial traders and people who used to work
abroad.
Petty traders will suffer the most both in the
short and in the long run. Their numbers
will fall rapidly, due to the relatively large
costs related to obtaining a visa. While there
are enough regular jobs in the oblast in
order to employ all people who stop cross1
border trade and smuggling, if such people
are employed they are very likely to get a
worse salary (compared to their previous
income); thus, their standards of living will
get worse as well.
Another group that will suffer permanently
effects is comprised of people who used to
work in the neighbouring country. Their
numbers will fall, especially the numbers of
those officially employed in the neighbour1
ing country.
#, JANUARY  policy studies 
 People worry about other aspects as well, which will be discussed in the next part of the paper.
 Another issue relevant to this discussion was raised by one of the businessmen, who touched on both
psychological and human1capital problems. Under psychological problems he meant that many people
who are accustomed to going across the border to buy and sell do not want to take regular, full1time jobs.
Another problem he is concerned with is the deterioration of human capital. He says that traders lose
their skills and qualifications, and after many years when a lot of people have traded across the border,
the oblast may face unemployment problems—vacancies but no qualified people, whereas there are
many ex1traders who are sometimes unwilling, sometimes not capable of doing a job. He also states that
at the moment he has a vacancy. The payment is higher than average wages in Ukraine and double the
average wage in the region; however, there are no applicants.
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According to respondents, in the short run,
legal entities for which cross1border coopera1
tion is important will also suffer, due to the
additional administrative costs related to get1
ting visas and learning the new rules of the
game. These costs will vary and will depend
on the particular business activity; they may
be substantive in some cases. The smallest
and weakest businesses, which cannot afford
additional costly procedures, are likely to
leave the market. The remainder, however,
will learn how to work in changed conditions
and make the necessary organisational
changes—which might end up being more
painful for employees rather than employers.
Most businessmen interviewed stressed that
they will get or have already got a visa that is
valid for some months, and they will visit the
neighbouring country as often as before.
One respondent predicted that his firm
might even gain in the short run.
Interestingly, he owns an appliance shop.
He noted that cross1border traders and
smugglers, who offer their goods at small
open1air markets, create strong price com1
petition for his shop, because the petty
traders and smugglers offer the same goods
at a lower price.
The argument about winners from limited
competition holds for other situations, as
well. For example, firms may get better
workers for a lower price because the visa
regime decreases the number of external
opportunities for many people.
In the long run, the changes will be unob1
servable for surviving businesses, and they
will probably end up gaining from the clari1
fication of certain rules of the game.
Survey respondents believed that in the short
run, the overall effect on the economic situ1
ation in the region will be negative.
Contraction of the number of self1employed
traders, as well as the number of Ukrainians
employed in Slovakia and Hungary, will raise
unemployment and decrease the incomes of
some people. This, however, is unlikely to
affect public revenues directly, because the
income of the mentioned groups is usually
hidden in the “shadow” economy. Anyway, it
will affect the expenditure burden of the
government, because of increased applica1
tions for social support. Moreover,
decreased personal incomes will have an
indirect negative effect on government rev1
enues, due to the contraction of demand
and, consequently, of indirect taxes paid.
Local firms will also contribute to the unem1
ployment problem. On the one hand, as it
was mentioned above, some of them will
leave the market. Other firms will adapt to
the new conditions, which often result in
the loss of jobs.
The respondents felt confident when dis1
cussing the short1run effects of border secur1
ing. It is not surprising because they have
had some experience at the Slovakian bor1
der. Evidence suggests that the introduction
of visas will have an immediate effect on
trade volumes, which have fallen rapidly and
recovered only partially to date. The effect
on unemployment has been weak, owing to
the liberal regime at the Hungarian border;
people changed their orientation and start1
ed to visit Hungary. Some of the interviewed
people think that a similar reaction may
weaken the negative unemployment effect
from the Hungarian border closure, with job
seekers going to Russia or eastern Ukraine.
We observed that respondents were less con1
fident when speaking about the long1term
effects of the border closure. However,
many of them were optimistic.
First of all, they believed that the economic
climate on the bordering territories is
 One respondent acknowledged that the change in the regime at the Slovakian border lead to organi1
sational changes in his firm; part of the operations moved to Lviv, which was accompanied with job con1
traction. 
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smoothing over time. Thus, when
Transcarpathia oblast has a common border
with the European Community, this will
force the development of the oblast.
Secondly, closure of the border will shift
resources from trade to production, which
in turn will hopefully promote stable eco1
nomic growth of the region.
Thirdly, the decrease of imports will simpli1
fy conditions for the work of domestic pro1
duction enterprises—which is not unlike
protectionism.
Summing up, we can say that our respon1
dents have the following expectations about
the long1run economic consequences of the
introduction of visas on the Western
Ukrainian borders:
• In the short run, individuals, firms, and
region will lose, on average, due to:
— the contraction of trade;
— increased unemployment;
— deterioration of the fiscal balance.
• In the long run, it will promote growth in
the oblast, because
— the least productive cross1border trade
will be cut off;
— the “shadow” economy will be reduced;
— strong and above1board businesses will
not be affected (at least not negative1
ly).
 We should mention the opinion expressed several time that, closing borders, Slovakia created prob1
lems for itself, because it lost a significant part of the Ukrainian market, which is beneficial for its local
enterprises. “Closure of the Slovakian border above all affected the Slovakian economy. Transcarpathia
oblast inhabitants adapted quickly: somebody goes [cross1border], somebody focuses on domestic prod1
ucts, that is, they do not bring Slovakian goods in [Ukraine] any longer, ... they work with our
[Ukrainian] goods, and it is beneficial for us [Ukraine].”—Businessman .
The surveyed community leaders in Lviv
region perceived the present situation at the
western frontiers of Ukraine in economic,
social, cultural, and political terms. The
Lviv region borders Poland, and in order to
cross it citizens of Ukraine do not need a
visa. 
We commenced our research when the
question of introducing the new visa rules
was becoming more and more timely,
given that in  Poland will join the
European Union, which demands new
conditions for border crossing, especially
for Ukrainian citizens. In respondents’
answers, the economic aspect had one of
the dominating positions; that is why we
approached this question from the eco1
nomic point of view. 
Respondents perceived the western border
and the borderland from the perspective of
their influence on:
• the financial situation of individuals and
families, and on the quality of their lives
and sources of income in Lviv region; 
• the financial situation of various eco1
nomic entities, ranging from factories to
firms in the trade and services sector; 
• economic conditions in towns, the
region, and the country. 
Respondents emphasised the strong direct
relationship between the financial conditions
of economic entities and the situation with
cross1border activity, which includes both
trade and transport services, as well as the
activity of small and medium1sized business.
Transparent frontiers allow citizens of
Ukraine not only to cross them, but also to
look for jobs in Poland. That, in its turn, has
stimulated people to start new small business1
es; it was especially popular – years ago. A
lot of people are still engaged in the trade
business between Poland and Ukraine, espe1
cially at the level of small villages and towns,
where the possibility to find work is low.
The close border location to Poland of Lviv
region determines the development of dif1
ferent kinds of businesses with Polish firms
and companies; in general, these are firms
which work in the furniture industry (Polish
technologies, Ukrainian materials), tourism,
trade, services, and education. Some of the
respondents stressed that such type of coop1
eration in trade is specific to the early, infor1
mal stage of trans1border economic coopera1
tion. It is expected that there will be more
such contacts in the future, and that they will
become more institutionalised.
According to the respondents, there is a
strong belief that economic cooperation will
change its form, from petty trade to larger1
scale business. 
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Attitudes towards the presentday
situation alongside Lviv region’s
border and in the borderland
Economic dimension
 “How do you think we managed to earn money to open this cafe in Lviv? We earned it in Poland, buy1
ing some goods there and selling them here, that helped us to have some money for much more serious
business.”—Businessman .
Western Ukraine’s location also gives an
advantage to those firms and entities which
export and import goods and services. It is
not always so that owners of such firms
employ a lot of workers, but then they would
employ people seasonally. 
A lot of respondents also stated that this
close cooperation with Poland stimulated
the development of the region from differ1
ent aspects such as culture, tourism, small
business, people’s mentality, etc. 
As for the influence of location on the
regional economy, it provides good income
to local budgets, but this cooperation
(Polish1Ukrainian) at the level of very small
businesses is starting to lose its impor1
tance.
Summarising the answers of all respon1
dents, we can say that the geopolitical situa1
tion of Lviv region plays an important role
in the life of its citizens. None of the
respondents pointed out any negative
effects of Polish1Ukrainian collaboration,
although there were some concerns con1
cerning heavy traffic, lots of lorries, and
worsening of the ecological situation; but
also it was pointed out that we should take it
into account and adopt special laws to regu1
late it.
According to the interviews, all respon1
dents appreciated the contacts between
neighbours on the two sides of the border.
In their opinion, since the late s, the
changes that encouraged border opening
also greatly intensified direct cross1border
contacts. 
The respondents perceived this change
not only from the point of view of treaties
on friendly neighbourliness, but also most1
ly from the perspective of local communi1
ties’ needs. Many inhabitants of Lviv
region have families, friends, and acquain1
tances in Poland. In their opinion, open1
ing the border is very advantageous,
because it makes it possible for families to
establish new contacts and refresh the old
ones.
Such cross1border family contacts were
particularly animated Lviv region at the
beginning of the s, when a sense of
personal freedom and freedom to decide
led to many instances of family ’reunifica1
tion’. According to the respondents,
around that time many people wanted to
visit the places where they were born. In
the following years, this spontaneous
process of renewing family contacts
evened out. Those contacts are still
intense, according to the respondents, but
more and more frequently they are eco1
nomically motivated, or manifest in the
desire to visit another country.
As for international marriages, according
to the respondents they are not wide1
spread. There are such examples, but most1
ly respondents said that they have only
heard about it, not that they knew specifi1
cally about examples of international mar1
riage. 
For the respondents, an open neighbour1
hood was also an advantage because it
stimulated a grassroots explosion of insti1
tutions and cultural, social, and religious
organisations in the borderland communi1
ties. A lot of respondents stated that for
them, Polish was not a foreign language;
children learn it at school, they watch
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Social and cultural dimension
 “There is no sense to go to Poland to buy a small consignment of goods, you can go to Lviv and buy
the same nearly for the same price at the wholesale depot centres in Lviv, or other cities situated not far
from the Polish border.”—Businessman .
Respondents regard the situation at the bor1
der and its regions also from the perspective
of Ukraine’s and neighbouring countries’
political systems. Most respondents—espe1
cially representatives of local government—
spoke about regional policy as a part of
national policy concerning international
relationships, including Poland. As a result,
it is rather difficult to talk about local needs
and expectations with respect to local policy,
because as a separate one it almost doesn’t
exist. 
Among the most important limits and hin1
drances in politics carried out pursuant to
the recommendations of central authori1
ties, the respondents gave the following
list:
Polish TV channels, and can read in
Polish.
Many respondents spoke warmly about the
local authorities in connection with their
participation or initiative in cross1border
cultural contacts. Also, it should be added
that Polish people in Lviv region are not
treated as a minority. There are also a num1
ber of cultural centres and Polish schools
in Lviv region. The Latin1rite
Polish/Roman Catholic Church is one of
the strongest churches in Lviv region. 
With regard to some conflicts between Polish
and Ukrainian peoples, mostly this implied
the memory of past Polish1Ukrainian con1
flicts, wrongs, and resentment, as well as the
influence of larger politics. It was also
stressed that the impact of history and big
politics was relatively stronger in the case of
older inhabitants of Lviv region, while the
young ones build mutual contacts without
looking back to the past. 
Respondents in Lviv region thought that the
situation on the border was not only con1
ducive to strengthening family ties or inter1
national marriages but also especially con1
ducive to economically motivated social con1
tacts. Many stressed the importance of com1
mercial contacts, which, in their opinion,
make social contacts easier. Respondents said
that typical business meetings often turned
into strong and lively friendships, after the
people have come to trust each other. 
A lot of respondents were happy that a lot of
Polish people come to see Lviv and visit
their acquaintances here in this region. In
general, all types of social ties created “at the
bottom” instil belief in the cooperation and
similarity of cultures and of people on both
sides of the border.
In summary, in the opinion of respondents
the current openness of the western border
is conducive to various contacts, i.e., with
family, friends, and cultural, educational,
and religious centres. This is important that
it allows not only for the countries to work
on good relations, but people (and institu1
tions) from around the border can also initi1
ate and cultivate good relations. 
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Political dimension
 “We have a constant exchange programs with Polish schools and schools from our city. We always invite
sport teams from Poland to participate in our sport events and vice1versa.”—City mayor .
 “The recent story about the Polish cemetery in Lviv is more a political issue than some kind of public
one. We do respect the will of Polish people and the sign there means nothing, the main thing is the
memory of those people who are buried there.”—City mayor .
 “How can we speak about some kind of regional policy – it doesn’t exist as regional policy because it
totally repeats the national and international policy, we do not have the autonomy to do it. What we can
do – we can make new contacts both in business, education, and culture, but it shouldn’t contradict to
the national policy.”—Representative of municipal government .
In this part of the report, we will present the
opinions expressed by inhabitants of Lviv
region regarding the upcoming changes on
Poland’s eastern border, especially securing
the borders pursuant to EU directives. We
will describe the opinions based on answers
to questions concerning the short and long1
term effects on local communities of secur1
ing the borders. We will present the opinions
pursuant to the method described above. 
Economic dimension
Respondents from Lviv region accepted the
idea of new borders in a different way.
Mostly they touched on the importance of
the economic aspect of the situation of the
borders and surrounding areas. Based on
their answers to our questions, this aspect
will become even more important after the
borders are secured.
The people we interviewed took into
account mostly the economical aspect of the
secured borders. They talked about both the
a) short1term effects (immediate changes)
and b) long1term effects (visions and plans)
for both Poland and Ukraine. 
In general, the immediate effects for both
local communities will be largely negative.
They saw many disadvantages, and expect1
ed:
• A marked decrease in the number of
people making a living from cross1bor1
der trade. In their opinion, both legal
(registered) businesses and wholesalers
will refrain from crossing the border for
commercial reasons (because of proce1
dural difficulties and because it won’t be
worth it economically). They believed
that when other possibilities for making
a living do not exist, such a situation may
destabilise the local community, espe1
cially in small cities where the local econ1
omy cannot provide people with jobs.
This may happen if the secured borders
increase unemployment and, in the
longer term, make people poorer,
including those who have a higher edu1
cation. 
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• lack of financial support from central1
level authorities, and no independent
financing;
• lack of autonomy from central1level
authorities to conduct own local policy,
• weak program partners, unprepared
organisationally or financially to start
cooperation on a partnership basis (refers
to partners on both sides of the border);
• lack of legislative regulations, with no
executive1type provisions (statutes,
agreements) setting forth general princi1
ples of cross1border cooperation.
According to the respondents, these factors
mean that contacts initiated with local
authorities on the other side remain local;
and despite the political will on both sides,
they are neither formalised nor have the
opportunity to be strengthened. In other
words, they do not become an element of
“cross1border politics”. Also, we should men1
tion the importance of Ukrainian1Polish
forums, which help both sides not only from
the business perspective but from the politi1
cal one. 
In summary, in respondents’ opinion, local
authorities do not have significant inde1
pendence—neither political nor financial—
from the central1level government, and as a
result it’s rather difficult to say that this fac1
tor furthers the development of local
municipalities. 
Securing Ukraine’s western borders: 
Prognosis and visions 
• Negative effects on the service sector in
the border region. Connected to fewer
people crossing the border, which will
generate less demand for specific border
crossing services (such as cafeterias,
hotels, hostels), this will also generate
unemployment and possible economical
decline in the region. 
• Negative effects on municipalities (not
just the oblast centre) as commercial
entities. Respondents expected the nega1
tives to be twofold. First of all, the bank1
ruptcy of small business (those which are
registered) would decrease municipal
revenues; and second, this would
decrease income levels of the whole city. 
• Decreasing the number of people cross1
ing the Ukrainian border that have the
possibility to travel to any EU country
without a visa, there is a big possibility
that tourism interest will fall steeply.
Long1term effects are judged much less crit1
ically. Respondents expected the following:
• Strong enterprises will increase cross1
border cooperation, i.e., those con1
ducting economic activity pursuant to
official agreements and pursuing this
activity beyond the border area. In the
respondents’ opinion, this may clarify
economic cooperation and limit its
uncontrolled and illegal forms, which
would increase investment safety and
security. 
• Different types of people will cross the
secured border. It was expected that
petty traders will be replaced by busi1
nessmen—people who have more
money, take business trips, are better
educated, and have cultural and scien1
tific connections; as a result, this will
improve the image of Ukraine as a coun1
try. 
• It is expected that border crossing rules
will be imposed that will not allow crimi1
nals to cross the border. 
• Re1orientation of small businesses to
other spheres, developing a national
light industry and national production. 
A lot of respondents have taken to new bor1
der regulations as normal thing, without
any dramatic results for Ukrainian econo1
my. Moreover, there was an opinion that
Poland as well as Ukraine will have difficult
times, especially in the short1term period,
because a lot of small enterprises worked,
and are still working, for Ukrainian con1
sumers. In Ukraine, this will be a good
chance for self1development, using Polish
best practices and experience of coopera1
tion. 
Social and cultural dimension
In the respondents’ opinion, there will be
few negative social and cultural conse1
quences, which was the opposite opinion to
that concerning economic consequences.
The changes will not affect good1neigh1
bourly relations between families and
friends. Family contacts and organised cul1
tural and educational cooperation will
remain the same. 
According to the respondents’ opinions,
visas cannot stop cultural relationships nor
business ones. Probably it will take more
time to get visas, but that doesn’t mean it
will be impossible to get visas, after all. So,
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 “What is the reason to go to Ukraine, wasting time and money for a visa, if you can just take a car and
go to Vienna or any other country, nearly with the same level of prices and with a much higher level of
services?”—Businessman .
 “Perhaps it will make it easier for large companies, those which have large1scale businesses, stronger
contacts at the central level. It will be much easier for such companies to survive, because they have a lot
of money and influence, both here and in Poland.”—Representative of local government .
In the opinion of all respondents, including
representatives of both types of local gov1
ernment (local and state), the fact of border
securing between Ukraine, Poland,
Slovakia, and Hungary was regarded under
the framework of the rules for European
Union enlargement. 
The decision was accepted as a fait accompli,
which did not require any discussion.
there is no sense to make a big problem of it;
whoever used to visit Poland will continue to
visit it.
More difficult than the new procedures and
organisational details will be the fewer indi1
vidual economic contacts. This will have a
negative impact on the creation of social
ties. It will impact people who do not often
participate in cultural activities but are
active in trans1border business.
Talking about tourism and the new visas, a
lot of respondents stated that they would pre1
fer to go to a country where they do not need
visas.
Political dimension
According to the respondents from Lviv
region, secured borders will regulate the rules
of border crossing. They did not expect great
changes after the time the border will be
secured. It was expected that in the begin1
ning, people connected with cross1border
activity will be looking for the new business
opportunities, and there was a fear that these
opportunities could not be provided by local
governments. A lot of the respondents regard1
ed this situation as being a limitation on devel1
opment.
By the way, respondents emphasised
Ukraine’s further development as an inde1
pendent country as one of the consequences
of the secured borders.
In summary, when respondents spoke about
the consequences of the secured borders,
local politicians talked about costs, losses,
fears, and dangers. They focused on the costs
mostly and not on the gains. The most impor1
tant costs were associated with:
• loss of jobs, rise of unemployment, and
decline of the local economy;
• new threats to the functioning coopera1
tion with local authorities from neigh1
bouring countries;
• limiting trans1border contacts, which will
increase social and political distances
between local communities.
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 “Visas will only take time; only those who did go to Poland before will do it. And if we talk about large
businesses, it’s practically impossible to stop collaboration; Poland is not the first EU country we are
working with, so there is no need to make a problem from that.”—Businessman .
 “Why should I waste my time getting a visa? I can first go to see my country, and if I want to go to the
seaside, I might go to the countries where I don’t need a visa.”—Businessman .
 “We do understand that it’s a fact; how it will influence us—no one knows. But I think that such a situ1
ation will cause the development of local territories, as we won’t have anyone to count on except our1
selves.”—Representative of local government .
 “Secured border means that we have to make new contracts and go through again all the procedures,
in case it is required by EU standards; that can complicate the cooperation.”—Businessman .
 “If we could go to Poland easily without any problems, and if it didn’t take time to get a visa at all, with the
new procedures I think it will decrease the level of those people who would just go to Poland to see either
relatives or to see the country. In the end, we both lose in this situation.”—Representative of minority .
The secured border: General expectations
People just described how it might influ1
ence their own lives, from both the positive
and negative aspects. 
Respondents believed that the fact that the
border will be secured will have mostly neg1
ative consequences. About the peoples who
live in the border region, we can mention: 
• a decline in the economic activity of
small businesses in the border region,
and the possible destruction of small
companies and firms;
• lifestyle changes of people who live in
these regions and were connected with
trans1border activity (and most respon1
dents thought that these changes would
not be for the better);
• positive aspects such as strict rules for
border crossing and decreased illegal
smuggling;
• negative influence on social and cultural
spheres.
Among the respondents there was a belief
that the consequences of secured borders
will be rather difficult for this part of
Ukraine. This opinion was that local inhabi1
tants would be discriminated against in com1
parison with other inhabitants of Ukraine,
because people from this part of Ukraine are
mostly engaged in different type of social
and religious contacts with neighbouring
countries and are conducting economical
activity (mostly trade) in this border region. 
In the first part of the report, we pointed out
various consequences (economic, cultural,
social, political) of open borders for the cit1
izens of Lviv and Transcarpathia regions.
The second part focused on respondents’
opinion on the immediate and long1term
effects of securing the borders.
The respondents expressed their opinions
on: a) the advantages and disadvantages of
securing the border; b) the direct conse1
quences; and c) predicting attitudes in
Western Ukraine’s border communities. In
addition, respondents had various expecta1
tions of those directly or indirectly involved
in new border policies. 
Many demands were directed at the central
authorities. Most importantly, respondents
feared that the border may become a new
“iron curtain”, especially for Ukrainians. They
want to make changes in the laws (administra1
tive procedures, etc., both at central and local
levels) that could determine possible ways for
obtaining visas for Ukrainians to have a
chance to go to Poland, Hungary, and the
Slovak Republic (although it doesn’t concern
Slovakia to such a great extent), and vice1versa. 
. Respondents expected that obtaining
visas would be easier if:
• New consulates were opened on both
sides of the border. It is very difficult to
go to Kyiv to receive visas. In order to
simplify the process, they proposed to
have consulates in Lviv and Uzhhorod. 
• Easier procedures for obtaining visas.
Preferably even visa exemptions for long1
term cultural, educational, or charity
cooperation.
• Special visas for people from border
municipalities, i.e., multiple1entry visas.
• Special visas for strengthening and devel1
oping family relations. Special proce1
dures for Ukrainian firms, companies,
and individuals who work with Polish,
Slovakian, and Hungarian companies, as
well as firms and individuals that carry
on legal economic, social, or cultural
activity. Respondents stressed the need
for easier procedures for all types of busi1
ness activity, and especially for family
businesses and small and medium1sized
Polish enterprises. 
• The visas shouldn’t be expensive, espe1
cially for people who live close to the
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Ukrainian1Polish and Ukrainian1Hun1
garian borders. 
. Respondents also expected local authori1
ties in the border regions (it is not certain
from which institutions, but in general) to
do the following:
• Negotiate a “border package”, which will
ease the consequences of the new border
policy.
• Construct international bus and train
stations.
• Improve local infrastructure and services.
• Ease local tax policies in order to interest
foreign investors. 
• Create laws and administrative proce1
dures that would take into account the
financial status of companies and institu1
tions interested in pursuing cross1border
cooperation.
Respondents representing local authorities,
businesses, and social and cultural centres
usually didn’t talk about their defined
expectations regarding the secured borders.
They spoke about it in an indefinite way,
which could be divided into optimistic and
pessimistic. But none of the respondents
identified more positive than negative
aspects of this question. 
Among the optimistic comments there were
the following: ) the border will be better
secured and it will decrease the level of ille1
gal activity; ) the crises caused by the
secured border and the decline of cross1bor1
der cooperation, will stimulate people who
live there to do something else in order to
survive.
We address our recommendations mainly
to the following authorities:
• Central government, which makes laws
governing border security and visa poli1
cy;
• To a lesser extent, local authorities
(local government and local representa1
tion of central government), associa1
tions and organisations active in the
western border region, as well as ordi1
nary citizens.
Essential recommendations addressed at
the central government concerned the fol1
lowing areas:
• Firstly, creation of a visa regime which
would be mindful of the specific needs
and interests of the border regions.
Inhabitants of those areas should be
privileged to receive cheap, multiple1
entry visas which would facilitate eco1
nomic, family, and cultural contacts;
• Secondly, creation of a visa regime
which would favour cooperation
between cultural and educational insti1
tutions on the two sides of the border;
Essential recommendations addressed at
central and local (including local self1gov1
ernment) authorities concerned the follow1
ing areas:
• Firstly, there should be developed a spe1
cial economic program that would aim
to decrease the level of unemployment
in these border regions. This program
should be directed at the reduction of
losses connected with the secured bor1
ders. This program should be developed
together with the representatives of
local government and with the engage1
ment of community leaders. 
• Secondly, it touches more the central gov1
ernment, which should create additional
positions for these regions in order to
support their development through dif1
ferent types of activities—special econom1
ical zones, tax cuts, financial support. 
• Thirdly, further the activity of active local
businesses after the border becomes
secured. Also, additional social and eco1
nomical projects, which would improve
the situation. It should be noted that
attention will have to be paid to social
and cultural relationships. The necessity
of continuous support of the authorities
for cross1border contacts of families and
institutions should also be emphasised. 
In our opinion, the above recommenda1
tions, especially those addressed at the cen1
tral government, demand regular updates
and corrections. In our opinion, this is pur1
suant to the necessity of adjusting the rec1
ommendations to fast1changing and often
difficult to predict social circumstances. 
Such corrections and adjustments require
sufficient substantial preparation. Therefore,
they should be based on systematically con1
ducted research projects on all of the strate1
gic dimensions (from the perspective of the
policy to secure the western border) of the
social life of entire local communities of the
borderland, and not just of selected commu1
nity leaders and representatives.
Hence, we address the following postulates
at the national and local governments:
• We believe that central and local author1
ities should commission the preparation
of forecasts of the social situation along1
side the western border to qualified
research institutions or research teams.
The forecasts should be: a) short1term,
concerning the situation in ; and 
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b) long1term, concerning also the situation
in the region after Poland joins the EU.
• The goal of such research papers would
be to compile an objective and method1
ologically correct comprehensive report
on: prognosticated public feeling across
a wide spectrum of local communities on
the Ukrainian1Polish and Ukrainian1
Hungarian borders (it should include
different dimensions as social, political,
economical and it should reflect peo1
ple’s attitudes towards those changes
that are taking place at present). 
• Research conducted by economists,
demographers, and political scientists
should cover issues of unemployment,
underprivileged areas, and various types
of social deviation in the borderlands of
Western Ukraine. 
• The research should be aimed at under1
standing social behaviour in the area,
which would make it possible to predict
social attitudes. We believe that research1
ing selected opinion1leading groups
would be the first step leading to
research on larger social groupings.
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